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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period of July 1, 1993 to June 31, 1994
which should be of interest to the real estate professional.
II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Gardner v. Weiler.' Judge Farmer wrote the opinion with which
Judges Gunther and Warner concurred. The seller signed a warranty deed
conveying property to her lawyer. She did not know that the deed had been
"fraudulently constructed"2 so as to effect a transaction different from the
one actually agreed upon. The lawyer had the acknowledgement notarized
out of the presence of the seller by a notary who was not aware of the
scheme nor a party to the scheme. The lawyer then recorded it. The seller
sued the notary and won a jury verdict for damages based on the theory that
the notarization allowed the deed to be recorded, which was a necessary
component in the buyer's fraudulent scheme, and thus, was the proximate
cause of the seller's harm.
The district court disagreed and reversed.3 It held that the notary's
conduct was not a substantial cause of the seller's loss, and consequently,
it was not the proximate cause.4 The unstated reasoning is probably based
on the court's belief that the seller would have acknowledged her signature
in person to the notary, if she had been asked to do so. Thus, her
negligence in taking the acknowledgement did not really further the
fraudulent scheme, which was the cause of her harm.
1. 630 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at 670. It is unclear from the opinion what actually happened, but footnote one
reveals that a judgment was obtained rescinding the conveyance.
3. Id. at 671.
4. Id.
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III. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Wheeling Dollar Bank v. City of Delray Beach.' Judge Klein wrote
the opinion with.which Judges Gunther and Farmer concurred. A landowner
died in 1931. His brother inherited a one-quarter interest and became a
tenant in common with the other heirs. The estate was closed in 1933. The
brother conveyed his interest to the City which took possession and built a
municipal tennis center on this land no later than 1937.
In 1990, the City brought an action to quiet the title. The owners of
the other three-quarter interest argued that the city was a co-tenant, and that
the applicable rule was that one co-tenant cannot acquire title by adverse
possession against another co-tenant who has not received actual notice of
the adverse possession claim. The circuit and district courts rejected this
argument.' They interpreted the precedents7 as requiring either actual
notice or possession which is so open and notorious as to put a co-owner on
notice of the adverse claim. In this case, the operation of a municipal tennis
center on the land for over fifty years was sufficient to satisfy the latter test.
The court also provided an alternative rationale for its holding. It
stated that the basis for the notice requirement is that "cotenants ought to be
able to repose confidence in each other."' However, the owners of the
three-quarter interest were not even aware that they owned an interest during
the period of adverse possession. Thus, there was no need to protect an
expectation of confidence.
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Arana v. Hutchison.' Chief Judge Harris wrote the opinion with which
Judges Dauksch and Thompson concurred. The buyer and sellers agreed to
the sale of a house. Complying with the terms of the document which the
buyer signed, the buyer put down a substantial initial deposit, two months
later put down an additional deposit, and for a period of two years made
monthly payments. The document also required that the buyer obtain a
financing commitment within two years. However, the seller never executed
a copy of the contract. Because the buyer did not have a signed copy of the
5. 639 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
6. Id. at 114-15.
7. Id. at 114 (citing Cook v. Rochford, 60 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1952) and Gracy v. Fielding,
70 So. 625 (Fla. 1916)).
8. Id. at 115.
9. 638 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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contract, she had difficulty obtaining a mortgage commitment. A "Contin-
gent Approval" was obtained from a lender two days before the end of the
two-year period, but notice was not sent to the sellers until two days after
the period ended. Consequently, the sellers declared the contract terminated.
The buyer sued for specific performance and won, but the trial court
held that each party was to bear the expense of its own attorney's fees. The
buyer appealed because the contract contained a provision that the prevailing
party in litigation would be entitled to attorney's fees. The district court
agreed.' 0 It noted that part of the specific performance decree required the
seller to execute the contract document." The court concluded that the
trial court apparently thought the terms of the contract document were not
in effect until it had been executed. 2  However, the attorney's fees
provision was a term in the contract as embodied by that document, and the
sellers consistently admitted that it existed. 3 Specific performance of the
contract was ordered. Thus, logically the attorney's fees provision of the
contract was also in force.
Diaz v. Security Union Title Insurance Co. 4 This was a per curiam
opinion by Judges Hubbart, Gersten, and Goderich. A husband and wife
owned a condominium as tenants in common. On the husband's death, the
wife began probate proceedings and then recorded a quitclaim deed which
appeared to vest the whole title in her. The other beneficiaries intervened
in the probate proceeding to contest the wife's claim to the unit. The
probate court enjoined the wife from disposing or encumbering her late
husband's interest.
The wife then sued to reform the deed, by which she and her husband
had taken title, so as to create a tenancy by the entirety. The estate
counterclaimed for partition and slander of title. The trial court held that
the wife and her husband's estate each owned a one-half interest, that the
estate was entitled to rent, and that the estate was entitled to attorney's fees
under section 64.081 of the Florida Statutes.5
On appeal, the district court affirmed except as to the amount of
attorney's fees.' 6 The statute provided for attorney's fees in a partition
action and in litigation which benefits the partition. Proving title was
10. Id. at 566.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The statute of frauds was not an issue discussed in this opinion.
14. 639 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
15. Id. at 1006.
16. Id.
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critical to the partition, thus, the attorney's fees expended by the estate in
the probate proceeding were for the benefit of the partition and could
properly be awarded. However, the statute provided that fees were to be
determined "on equitable principles in proportion to his interest.,"7
Therefore, since each party to the partition had a one-half interest, the estate
should have been awarded only one half of its attorney's fees.'"
Prosperi v. Code, Inc.'9 Justice Grimes wrote the majority opinion
with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. The opinion addressed the two following
certified questions from the Fourth District Court of Appeal:
IS AN OWNER WHO PREVAILS ON A COMPLAINT BY A CON-
TRACTOR OR SUB-CONTRACTOR TO ENFORCE A MECHANIC'S
LIEN UNDER PART I, CHAPTER 713, FLORIDA STATUTES
(1989), ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 713.29, EVEN
THOUGH, IN THE SAME SUIT, THE CONTRACTOR PREVAILED
AGAINST THE OWNER ON A CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES
FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT, BOTH CLAIMS ARISING
OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION?
DOES THE TEST OF MORITZ V. HOYT FOR DETERMINING WHO
IS THE PREVAILING PARTY FOR THE PURPOSES OF AWARD-
ING ATTORNEY'S FEES APPLY TO FEES AWARDED UNDER
SECTION 713.29, FLORIDA STATUTES?20
Prosperi, the owner, hired Code, a contractor, to make improvements
on real property. A dispute arose over the amount Prosperi had paid to
Code. Code then left the job site. Code brought suit to foreclose on a
mechanic's lien and for breach of contract against Prosperi, who counter-
claimed for breach of contract. The trial court determined that $31,898.01
remained unpaid, and that $14,588.95 should be deducted for payments to
another contractor to finish the job.2' The court denied Code's attorney's
fees. The court also denied Prosperi attorney's fees, because he was not the
prevailing party, even though Code had filed false affidavits on mechanic's
liens.22 Prosperi appealed and the trial court's decision was quashed.23
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
20. Id. at 1361.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1362-63.
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The Florida Supreme Court stated that there is no unqualified answer
as to the first certified question. 24 Had Prosperi prevailed solely on an
issue of a mechanic's lien, which was brought forward with fraudulent
affidavits, he would have been awarded attorney's fees. It was not the
intent of the legislature to grant attorney's fees to a defendant who
successfully defended against a mechanic's lien, but was still found liable
for labor and materials and for breach of contract in the same case. Simply
receiving a judgment does not mean that one is the prevailing party.
Neither is the net judgment rule dispositive on the issue. The owner was
innocent as to the lien, and as such, was entitled to attorney's fees. The
contractor was not entitled to attorney's fees under the circumstances of this
case. Therefore, the court answered the second certified question in the
affirmative.
State, Department of Transportation v. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc.26 Judge
Blue wrote the opinion. Acting Chief Judge Threadgill and Judge Quince
concurred. The Department of Transportation brought an action to condemn
property. The respondent was joined as a party because it possibly had
acquired a prescriptive easement. The respondent retained an attorney and
filed an answer. After it concluded that it did not have any interest in the
property and agreed to be dropped from the action, the trial court granted
its motion for attorney's fees.27
The district court reversed.2 ' A claim for attorney's fees must be
based upon a contract or a statute. This claim was based on section 73.091
of the Florida Statutes which provides: "Except as provided in s. 73.092,
the petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit
court, including, but not limited to, a reasonable attorney's fee . ... 9
There was nothing in section 73.092 to prevent this respondent from
recovering attorney's fees. However, the district court used the purpose
approach to deny fees to this respondent.
The purpose of this statute was to make whole a landowner whose
property has been taken. This respondent did not have any property.
Therefore, the purpose of this statute would not be accomplished by
allowing this respondent to recover attorney's fees. While the court was
24. Prosperi, 626 So. 2d at 1363.
25. Id.
26. 636 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
27. Id. at 826.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993).
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following established precedent," the reasoning was based upon an
unacceptable premise. In fact, the purpose of requiring compensation for
landowners whose land has been taken by the government is to prevent
public burdens of society from being unduly shifted to a narrower class.
The attorney's fees statute should further that purpose as well. In this case,
the respondent had not become part of a narrower class forced to shoulder
the cost of a societal need when it became obligated to pay attorney's fees
to protect whatever interest it might have had in this land.
V. BROKERS
Baxas Howell Mobley, Inc. v. BP Oil Co.3 Judge Gersten wrote the
opinion for the panel which included Judges Nesbitt and Jorgenson. A
broker was allegedly offered the following deal: the buyer would pay a
commission if it acquired a particular property; but, the buyer would pay the
commission only if the broker could not get a commission from the seller.
The seller filed for bankruptcy and the buyer eventually bought the property
from the bankrupt's estate. The broker filed a claim in bankruptcy for its
commission. The claim was denied because the bankruptcy court concluded
the broker was not employed by the seller and was not the procuring cause
of the sale.32
The broker then sued the buyer in state court. The buyer raised the
defenses of: 1) claim preclusion (res judicata) and 2) issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel). The buyer's theory was that the seller's bankruptcy
also had relieved it of its obligation to pay a commission, which could not
be obtained from the seller. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the buyer, but the district court reversed.33
Claim preclusion would only apply if the two cases involved the same
claim or cause of action. This action involved breach of a commission
contract with the buyer. The bankruptcy claim involved breach of a
commission contract with the seller. Because these were different contracts,
claim preclusion was inapplicable.
Since the bankruptcy court is a federal court, the federal theory of issue
preclusion was applied. For issue preclusion to apply, the issue decided in
30. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc., 636 So. 2d at 826 (citing Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.
2d 684 (Fla. 1954)). The rule is that only a landowner whose land was taken may recover
attorney's fees under this statute. See id.; see also Grieser v. State, Dep't of Transp., 371
So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
31. 630 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
32. Id. at 208-09.
33. Id. at 210.
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the first case must be the same as the issue in the later case. The issue in
this case was whether the broker had a commission contract with the buyer.
However, the issues decided in the bankruptcy court were whether the
broker was employed by the seller and whether the broker had been the
procuring cause of the sale. These issues were not the same. Thus, issue
preclusion was inapplicable.
Edelstein v. Flanagan.34 Judge Klein wrote the opinion. Chief Judge
Dell and Senior Judge Downey concurred. The sole shareholder of a
business listed it for sale with a real estate broker. A buyer was located and
a contract for the sale of the business's assets was executed. Later, the
parties entered into a new contract for the sale of seller's shares of stock,
rather than the business's assets. The seller accepted promissory notes for
part of the purchase price. The buyer then defaulted on the notes.
Consequently, the seller sued.
The buyer claimed, inter alia, that he was entitled to rescission based
upon the Florida Securitiep and Investor Protection Act." The theory was
that the transaction involved the sale of securities, the broker was not
licensed as a securities broker, and under Florida law any sale of securities
by someone not licensed is subject to rescission. 36 The court rejected this
claim." It noted that the broker was engaged to find a buyer for the
business, which is what the broker did. Even though the transaction was
ultimately structured to be the sale of the corporate stock, it did not
transform the nature of the brokerage into securities brokerage covered by
the Securities Act.
The legislature has amended chapter 475 of the Florida Statutes, which
regulates real estate brokers and salespeople, to deal with the responsibilities
to the buyer.3' Definitions are provided for "disclosed dual agent," who
is the agent of both the buyer and seller and owes each a fiduciary duty, and
"transaction broker," who is not the agent of either the buyer or the seller
but acts to facilitate the sale and owes each a duty of disclosure of known
facts. 39  The broker or salesperson must disclose whether he or she is
34. 630 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
35. FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1989).
36. Id. § 517.211(1).
37. Edelstein, 630 So. 2d at 1206.
38. Act of July 1, 1994, ch. 94-119, § 134, 1994 Fla. Laws 233, 342. Chapter 94-119
also involves amendment to the regulations of a wide array of professions. Inter alia, it also
modifies the procedure to recover from the Real Estate Recovery Fund. Act of Oct. 1, 1994,
ch. 94-337, § 4, 1994 Fla. Laws 2233, 2235 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.482).
39. FLA. STAT. § 475.01 (1991), amended by, Act of July 1, 1994, ch. 94-119, § 134,
1994 Fla. Laws 233, 342.
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acting as an agent or as a transaction broker. If the broker or salesperson
is going to act as a dual agent, he must get written permission to do so, and
he must disclose for whom he is acting as an agent.
VI. CONDOMINIUMS
Bisque Associates of Florida, Inc. v. Towers of Quayside No. 2
Condominium Ass 'n.40 Judge Nesbitt wrote the opinion. Bisque Associates
is the owner of a condominium at the Towers of Quayside. A series of
drainage backups caused approximately $10,000 in damage. Bisque sought
damages for diminution of value to the rental property. At trial, Quayside
requested that the judge exclude all evidence of the diminution of value,
arguing that the difficulties were temporary. Bisque argued that it could no
longer rent the unit. The trial judge held for Quayside.41 The jury found
damages for repairs only.42
Bisque appealed. The question was whether determination of a
permanent or temporary injury to real property is a matter of law or a jury
question. This was a question which had not been explicitly addressed in
Florida. 3 Bisque wanted to plead impairment to value because of its
requirement to disclose material facts to potential buyers. Per the majority,
even though the court can rule on the expertise of witnesses, it should not
prevent the jury from hearing evidence because it decided the damage was
not permanent.44 Therefore, the judgment as to the permanent nature of
the damages was reversed.45
Braemer Isle Condominium Ass'n v. Boca H, Inc.46 In a prior
settlement over construction defects, the condominium association released
Hyman from all claims known or unknown. Subsequently, further defects
were discovered in the same buildings which were the subjects of the
previous litigation. Braemer brought suit against Hyman on these damages.
Hyman was awarded a summary judgment based upon the previous
settlement.
47
Braemer appealed the summary judgment. The settlement which ended
the previous litigation was the culmination of a two-year discovery process
40. 639 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
41. Id. at 999.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Bisque Assocs., 639 So. 2d at 1000.
46. 632 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1994).
47. Id. at 707.
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which went to a jury trial. The settlement was entered by two parties of
equal bargaining power and was not the result of fraud, coercion, or undue
influence." Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment.49
Brooks v. Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n.50 Brooks was the
owner of a condominium at Ocean Village. As a result of unpaid condo-
minium assessments totaling $3984.44, the association sought to foreclose
a lien against Brooks. At trial, a default judgment was entered against
Brooks. The trial court denied Brooks' motion to set aside the default."
Brooks appealed, asserting that the trial court, a circuit court, was
without jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. County courts are now
included among the courts with competant jurisdiction to hear foreclosure
matters. The district court held that, as the amount at issue was within the
jurisdictional limit of the county court, the circuit court was without
jurisdiction to enter the default and default judgment, and therefore reversed
and remanded the case to county court.52
Fisher v. Tanglewood at Suntree Country Club Condominium Ass 'n.
Fisher owns several units in the Tanglewood condominiums, all of which
are located in building 1100. Fisher refused to pay special assessments, as
none of his units were in the buildings on which the association levied the
assessments. The association filed a three count complaint seeking
foreclosure, money damages, and injunctive relief. Fisher counterclaimed
with declaratory judgment, slander of title, abuse of process, and breach of
fiduciary duty. The trial court awarded summary judgment for the
association on foreclosure, abuse of process, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The other counts were not disposed of by the trial court. 4
Count I of the complaint was a non-final judgment. Count II alleged
the same grounds, but sought a different remedy (money damages). Count
III of the counterclaim, abuse of process, was moot, as the court granted the
foreclosure. Misuse of process, after the process issues, constituted abuse
of process. Count IV was properly dismissed because the counterclaim
failed to state a cause of action in that Tanglewood was named in the action,
not the board of directors. 5
48. Id.
49. Id. at 708-09.
50. 625 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
51. Id. at 111.
52. Id. at 112.
53. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D483 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1994).
54. Id. at D483.
55. Id.
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The trial court also required Fisher to pay $7200 during the pendency
of the trial to Tanglewood 6 This amount reflected a compromise wherein
monies were paid in lieu of the appointment of a receiver. Fisher failed to
include any transcript of the record, and as such, could not prove reversible
error. Therefore, the order was affirmed."
Glynn v. Siegal." This is ani opinion written by Judge Stevenson with
which Judges Anstead and Pariente concurred. The question before the
court was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment of
foreclosure against those unit owners who failed to pay their monthly fee on
a community facilities lease. 9
The question arose when certain unit owners challenged the procedure
used by the lessor of the facilities. The lessor devised a program by which
a unit owner could purchase an undivided interest in the lease. This resulted
in a warranty deed to the purchasing unit owner for that share. That unit
owner would receive a monthly sum equivalent to the rent. On the books,
the lessor showed the due payments as counterbalancing entries. The result
was that the purchasing unit owner no longer had to mail in his or rent
under the lease. Non-purchasing unit owners asserted that the transaction
resulted in a rent reduction for the purchasing unit owners. As a result, they
claimed it violated the mandate that all unit owners were obligated equally
for common expenses."
The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment. 1 It reasoned
that each owner still had the obligation to pay the monthly rent. The only
difference was that the purchasing unit owners were to receive an equal
amount in return for their investment. Thus, the court stated that eliminat-
ing double check writing did not alter the obligation to pay rent.62
Islander Beach Club Condominium Ass'n of Volusia County v.
Johnston."3 Johnston was the owner of three condominium unit weeks at
Islander Beach Club. On December 5, 1992, a meeting was to be held in
order to elect three directors for the Board of Administration. Proxy votes
were maintained in a secure area and unopened until inspected by an
independent Certified Public Accounting firm prior to election. Johnston
56. Id. at D484.
57. Id.
58. 637 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
59. Id. at 325.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 623 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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waged a proxy fight and demanded to see the sealed proxies. Islander
refused, as it considered the proxies "non-public" until three days before the
election when they would be opened. Johnston obtained an injunction to
inspect the voting proxies as they were received.'
Islander appealed. The district court stated that the most logical
interpretation of section 718.111 of the Florida Statutes is that voting
proxies are not "official records" subject to inspection until after the election
for which they were given. However, this does not mean that sealed proxies
can not be inspected as they come in. If the management has information,
then such information must be made available to the membership.
Nevertheless, a voting proxy has no legal effect until the vote is actually
cast. As proxies are reversible until cast, they are not official records."
Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass 'n.66 Judge Klein
wrote the opinion with which Chief Judge Dell and Judge Anstead
concurred. The front doors of the individual condominium units at Vista
Plantation are on the outside of the building. The declaration of condomini-
um prohibits unit owners from making alterations in the appearance of the
exterior of the buildings.67 The problem arose when the condominium
association permitted Mr. and Mrs. Korandovitch and other condominium
owners to replace their screen doors with storm doors having tinted
windows. The storm doors blocked the view of the units' address numbers
located on the units' front doors. The owners, inquiring into whether the
association would approve a request to permit them to install address
numbers on their walls, next to the doors, received information that the
board would not permit it. The unit owners installed the numbers without
getting the association's approval and the board sued to obtain a permanent
injunction prohibiting the current placement of the numbers. The trial court
granted, by summary judgment, a permanent injunction in favor of the
board." The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.69
In determining whether it was proper for the trial court to resolve the
dispute on summary judgment, the district court noted there are two
categories of restrictions with regard to condominiums." One category
involves restrictions actually located in the applicable declaration of the
64. Id. at 629.
65. Id.
66. 634 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
67. Id. at 274.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 275.
70. Id. at 274-75.
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condominium. These are more like covenants running with the land. As
such, courts presume they are valid. The only bases for invalidating these
types of restrictions is finding that the particular restriction is completely
arbitrary as applied, that it violates public policy, or that it abrogates a
fundamental constitutional right.7 Another category involves restrictions
not expressly found in the declaration. These restrictions are usually made
by the board at its discretion. Such restrictions are judged by a measure of
reasonableness. Since the declaration in this case did not expressly address
the placement of the units' address numbers, the court determined that the
restriction fell into the second category.72 In this category the board has
discretion to pass rules and make decisions that are reasonably related to the
unit owners' health, happiness, and peace of mind.73
The owners argued that there was a safety issue as the numbers could
not be seen through the tinting, and as the board approved the tinted storm
doors, the board should be estopped from preventing the application of the
numbers. After considering these arguments and looking at the photographs
included in the record, the appellate court reversed the summary judg-
ment.74
Pine Ridge at Haverhill Condominium Ass 'n v. Hovnanian of Palm
Beach I1, Inc.7' Damages were awarded to the condominium association
for construction defects which included inadequate lighting and water
intrusion from improperly installed windows. After the verdict was entered,
the motion for prejudgment interest was denied, because the jury did not
determine a date of IOSS.
76
The association appealed and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed.77 Because no date of loss was set, the damages could have been
fixed at the time the property was turned over. As such, interest should be
awarded from that date forward.7" The court also reversed the appellee's
award of attorney's fees and stated that after the calculation of prejudgment
interest, the amount recovered would not be over 25% less than the offer.7 9
71. Korandovitch, 634 So. 2d at 274-75.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 629 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 639 So. 2d 978 (Fla.
1994).
76. Id. at 151.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 151-52.
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Therefore, an award of fees based on a rejection of an offer would be in
error.
8 0
Rogers & Ford Construction Corp. v. Carlandia Corp.8 Chief Justice
Barkett wrote the majority opinion and Justices McDonald, Shaw, Grimes,
Kogan, and Harding joined. Justice Overton concurred with an opinion.
Carlandia purchased a condominium developed by Rogers and Ford. Four
years later, Carlandia brought suit for defects to the common areas, but
alleged no defects to the individual unit." The circuit court dismissed the
claim with prejudice, finding that Carlandia did not have individual standing
and did not join the condominium association as an indispensable party.83
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed finding that Carlandia had
standing to sue, since it possessed an individual share of the common
areas.84 Nevertheless, the district court certified to the Florida Supreme
Court the question "[m]ay an individual condominium unit owner maintain
an action for construction defects in the common elements or common areas
of the condominium?" 85
The supreme court restated the question as two questions:
(1) Does a condominium unit owner have standing to sue the developer
or general contractor to recover damages for construction defects or
deficiencies in the common elements or common areas of the condo-
minium?
(2) If so, must the interests of the other unit owners be represented in
the suit for the unit owner with standing to maintain the action?86
Thereafter, it answered both questions affirmatively.
87
The supreme court reasoned that the legislature cannot determine who
has standing to sue, for that is a judicial function.88 Usually, the courts
look to one holding a legally protectable right or interest in jeopardy, or
having an interest in some other justiciable controversy, as being one who
may seek judicial determination of that issue. Such a person or entity
typically is classified as a real party in interest for the purposes of Florida
80. Pine Ridge, 629 So. 2d at 152.
81. 626 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1993).
82. Id. at 1351.
83. Id. at 1351-52.
84. Id. at 1352.
85. Id. at 1351.
86. Rogers & Ford Constr. Corp., 626 So. 2d at 1351.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1352.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a). The allegations in Carlandia's complaint
identified a sufficient threatened interest. Carlandia's undivided share of the
common elements would be affected by damages to them.
A further question was whether the legislature affected the right to sue
for such defects by transferring that right to the condominium association."
In looking at section 718.111(3) of the Florida Statutes, the supreme court
noted that the statute does not designate the condominium association as the
sole holder of the right to sue. The statute merely gives the association the
capacity to bring suit. The court noted that the statute expressly reserved
to the unit owners their statutory and common law rights to sue without
necessarily involving the association.9" Those rights include the right to
sue for construction defects.9' Therefore, the supreme court held that a
condominium unit owner has standing to sue the developer or general
contractor to recover damages for construction defects or deficiencies in the
common elements or common areas of the condominium.92 However, as
a matter of judicial economy to avoid "piecemeal litigation," the individual
owner may bring such suits only after the owner has taken steps necessary
to assure that the other unit owners' interests are represented in the
immediate litigation.93 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court expressly stated
that it did not determine whether a unit owner might proceed with an
individual action against the association or its board members for failing to
pursue the claims, since that question was not presented by this case.94
Taylor v. Wellington Station Condominium Ass'n." The association
filed a complaint that Taylor, a member of the association's Board of
Directors, had breached his fiduciary duty. Taylor was also an officer of the
developer and a 25% shareholder in the developer. The association alleged
that Taylor failed to enforce obligations of the developer, and failed to
designate expenses properly chargeable to the developer. The trial court
entered partial summary judgment finding Taylor personally liable for
willfully breaching his duties.96 The question of willfulness is properly
decided by a jury. The evidence did not eliminate the factual issue as to
89. Id. at 1352-53.
90. Id. at 1353.
91. Rogers & Ford Constr. Corp., 626 So. 2d at 1354.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1355 n.7.
95. 633 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
96. Id. at 44.
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whether Taylor's conduct rose to the level required for individual liability.
Therefore, the district court reversed.97
Torres v. K-Site 500 Associates.98 On October 22, 1989, Torres and
Lueckhardt entered into a contract to purchase a condominium from K-Site
500 Associates. A deposit of $25,580 was placed on the unit, but Ms.
Lueckhardt stated that she wanted the unit placed in her name only. The
two buyers were not married and Torres had an inadequate financial history
for a mortgage. K-Site informed the buyers that although the two names
were on the agreement, Lueckhardt could finance by herself. Lueckhardt
submitted the application for financing and received a thirty-year fixed
mortgage at 9.625%. 9'
In February of 1991, the buyers received a letter from K-Site informing
them that the project was near completion and they would be receiving
information about closing. Additionally, in the fifth paragraph, there was
a sentence which stated that the letter constituted notification concerning
paragraph three of the purchase agreement. Paragraph three stated that the
buyer's obligation to purchase was contingent upon a commitment for a
mortgage, and specified a ten-day period for submission of a mortgage
application.'00
The application was rejected because Torres was not on the applica-
tion.' When resubmitted the terms were 11%. The buyers sought to
recover the deposit. The trial court found for the sellers, because the
application was submitted after the ten-day period. 2
According to the appellate court, although the application was not
submitted within the ten-day period after receipt of the letter, the letter was
not proper notification that an application was required to be submitted.
Therefore, the ten-day period could be waived. It would be inequitable to
allow the sellers to recover the deposit when they acquiesced in the breach.
Therefore, it reversed the lower court. 3
Further, as to condominiums, an amendment to section 718.116 of the
Florida Statutes became law on June 3, 1994 without the governor's
approval. 0 4 The amendment includes greater detail as to the liability of
97. Id. at 45.
98. 632 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
99. Id. at 111.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Torres, 632 So. 2d at 112.
104. Act of Oct. 1, 1994, ch. 94-350, § 10, 1994 Fla. Laws 2367, 2385.
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unit owners for unpaid assessments, regardless of how they acquired title to
the property. Particularly, a first mortgagee which acquires title by
foreclosure or by deed in lieu of foreclosure would be liable for prior
assessments. However, limitations have been provided in the amendment.
Of note, the amendment as to first mortgagees applies only to those first
mortgagees whose mortgages were recorded after April 1, 1992. The act as
amended will take effect October 1, 1994.05
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Moorman v. Department of Community Affairs."0 6 Judge Gersten
wrote the opinion. Judge Baskind filed a concurring opinion. Chief Judge
Schwartz filed an opinion specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The property involved was located within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical
Concern in Monroe County. Some landowners had obtained permits to
build fences on their land. When the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission rescinded their permits, the landowners appealed. The reason
for the rescission was that Monroe County Land Development Regulations
banned all fences in the area; the regulation provided there would be no
exceptions.
The court pointed out that an exercise of the police power must relate
to public health, safety, and welfare and that the means chosen to implement
the regulation must "bear a reasonable and substantial relation to the purpose
sought to be attained."'0 7 Following a basic rule of construction, the court
should try to sustain the constitutionality of a statute by indulging every
reasonable doubt in favor of its constitutionality, i.e., by interpreting it, if
possible, to be in harmony with the constitution. On the other hand, the
Florida Constitution recognizes the importance of private property' and
the importance of minimizing government intrusion into the lives of its
citizens.'0 9 Consequently, the means chosen must be narrowly tailored to
be the least restrictive means. The district court found that the record would
not support a finding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied."0
105. Id. at 2357.
106. 626 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 639 So. 2d 977
(Fla. 1994).
107. Moorman, 626 So. 2d at 1110 (quoting In re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592
So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 1992)); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
108. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
109. See id. § 23.
110. Moorman, 626 So. 2d at 1111.
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Thus, it proceeded to consider a facial challenge, concluding that it was
unconstitutional because the statute was not narrowly tailored."'
Chief Judge Schwartz correctly, but without explanation, challenged
this logic."' The purpose of the regulation was to protect an endangered
species, the Key Deer. The record revealed that only one of the four
properties involved was actually in the Key Deer's natural habitat, so that
fences on the other three properties would not harm the deer. In some
cases, fences might actually be beneficial to the Key Deer. In addition, the
fence was necessary for one landowner to protect his children from falling
into the nearby canal, a serious danger. These facts could and should have
been sufficient to demonstrate that the regulation was not constitutional as
applied to these properties.
VIII. CONSTRUCTION
The legislature amended the State Emergency Management Act"t3 by
adding a new statute" 4 to deal with contractor rip-offs during a declared
emergency,115 that causes "damage to a significant number of residential
structures,"'"1 6 or during the two years following enactment, in the area
covered by the Hurricane Andrew emergency proclamation." 7 If the
contract is to make repairs or improvements to residential real property, the
contractor can use deposits or advances only: a) to purchase materials
related to the contract;".8 b) to pay for work done under the contract; or
c) to pay for governmental fees or charges, e.g., permit fees needed to
perform the contract. Additionally, the contractor can only use up to 15%
to pay necessary expenses and overhead connected with the contract."'
A contractor who has received over 10% of the contract price is
required to apply for permits within thirty days and to begin work within
111. Id.
112. See Chief Judge Schwartz's special concurrence and dissent. Id.
113. FLA. STAT. §§ 252.31-.63 (1993).
114. Act of July 1, 1994, ch. 94-110, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 151, 151 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 252.361).
115. An emergency can be declared by the governor. It may not continue for longer
than sixty days unless renewed by the governor. It may be terminated by the governor or
by a concurrent resolution of the legislature. FLA. STAT. § 252.36(2) (1993).
116. Ch. 94-110, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 152.
117. Id. §2, at 152.
118. FLA. STAT. § 252.361(2) (1993).
119. Id.
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ninety days after receiving the permits.' A contractor is prohibited from
not performing for a ninety-day period, if it is done with an intent to
defraud.' The statute provides an inference that intent to defraud exists
if the contractor has received money for future work, and has failed to
perform for thirty days after the date of receiving notice to perform. 2
Notice to perform could be given after sixty days of nonperformance.
Violation of this statute constitutes theft.' Depending on the
amount, the conduct may be classed as petit theft, which is a misdemeanor,
or grand theft,2 4 which may be classified as a felony of the first, second,
or third degree. The penalty could be as much as thirty years imprison-
ment.
25
Castro v. Sangles.126  Chief Judge Schwartz wrote the opinion.
Landowners hired an unlicensed contractor and then obtained a building
permit by making the sworn misrepresentation that no contractor would be
involved in the construction. Subsequently, the landowners sued the
contractor over his alleged breach of the construction contract. The trial
court dismissed the case, holding that the contract was unenforceable under
section 489.128 of the Florida Statutes127 The district court affirmed.
28
The statute provided:
As a matter of public policy, contracts entered into on or after October
1, 1990, and performed in full or in part by any contractor who fails to
obtain or maintain his license in accordance with this part [chapter 489,
Part I] shall be unenforceable in law, and the court in its discretion may
extend this provision to equitable remedies. 9
The district court pointed out the general rule, that no action can be
maintained on an illegal contract if a person is himself guilty of a wrongdo-
ing. Certainly that is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which
120. Id. § 252.361(3).
121. Id. § 252.361(4)(a).
122. Id. § 252.361(4)(b). The contents of the notice to perform are specified in §
252.361(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes.
123. FLA. STAT. § 252.361(5) (1993).
124. Id. § 812.014(2).
125. Id. § 775.082(3)(b).
126. 637 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
127. Id. at 990.
128. Id. at 992.
129. Id. at 990 n.1.
1994]
Nova Law Review
provides that the contract is "unenforceable." Next, the district court
explained why the exceptions to this rule would not apply.
When a statute makes a contract illegal in order to protect a narrow
class of victims, the contract's illegality may not be used to further victimize
that class. Thus, if this statute was intended to protect consumers, it could
not be invoked to victimize consumers. However, the purpose of this
subsection is to protect the general public from a wide range of ills
associated with unlicensed contractors. 3 Therefore, this exception was
not applicable.
Another exception is that a wrongdoer may not invoke the rule to the
detriment of an innocent party. However, the parties here were in pari
delicto. The landowners had engaged in prohibited conduct, when
apparently in order to get a lower price, they had misrepresented the facts
to get the permit. They claimed to have suffered from one of the anticipat-
ed harms of using an unlicensed contractor, shoddy work.
It should be noted that in 1993, the legislature moved to strengthen the
statute. 3 ' The 1991 version of the statute made the contract unenforce-
able at law. The court of equity could, in its discretion, extend that
protection to equity. Now the contract is unenforceable in equity as
well.
32
IX. COVENANTS, DEEDS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Loveland v. CSX Transportation, Inc.'33 Judge Jorgenson, joined by
Judges Ferguson and Goderich, wrote the court's opinion. The court
reversed summary judgment in favor of titleholders in an action to enforce
a reversionary interest in a 1926 deed.' 34
130. See FLA. STAT. § 489.101 (1991).
The Legislature recognizes that the construction and home improvement
industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when incompetent
or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or
services. Therefore, it is necessary in the interest of the public health, safety,
and welfare to regulate the construction industry.
Id.
131. Act of July 1, 1993, ch. 93-166, § 17, 1994 Fla. Laws 1015, 1041.
132. "As a matter of public policy, contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1990,
and performed in full or in part by any contractor who fails to obtain or maintain his license
in accordance with this part [chapter 489, Part I] shall be unenforceable in law or in equity."
FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (1993) (emphasis added).
133. 622 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134. Id. at 1123.
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In 1926, Redlands Sales Co. transferred property to the predecessor in
interest to CSX. The warranty deed provided that in the event the property
was abandoned and not used for railroad purposes, it would revert to the
grantor. In 1984, 1985, and 1987, CSX sold portions of this property to
purchasers who did not use their respective lots for railroad purposes. In
1990, Loveland, the successor in interest to Redlands, brought an action for
declaratory relief seeking a reverter, quiet title, and ejectment against CSX
and the subsequent purchasers of the property.' All parties filed motions
for summary judgment. The trial court granted a summary judgment against
Loveland, holding that CSX had not abandoned the property, and even if it
did, that the statute of limitations and laches barred any action because of
earlier leases by CSX. 36
The district court, in reversing the summary judgment noted that,
although a restriction is construed strongly against the grantor, it must be
construed within the intent of the parties. 137 If there is only one construc-
tion which gives full effect to the instrument's words, that construction
should be used.'38 CSX contended that reverter is improper as long as the
railroad operated on the property, even if there were a substantial transfer
of property. The district court rejected this.'3 9 The intent of the restric-
tion was for the property to be used for railroad purposes.
Since CSX still operated a railroad on the property, the district court
decided that two questions needed to be answered. The first was whether
the transferred parcels were abandoned or no longer used for railroad
purposes. 4 A "railroad purpose" is one for the primary benefit of the
public and not an individual. 4 ' Therefore, if parcels are conveyed to
those who are not using the property for railroad purposes, the restriction is
violated and the reverter clause may apply. The sales in this case violated
the restriction.'42
The second question, if the reverter clause applied, is whether there
might be a reversion only as to those parcels which were no longer used for
railroad purposes."' The district court noted that partial reversion has
135. Id. at 1121.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Loveland, 622 So. 2d at 1121.
139. Id. at 1122.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Loveland, 622 So. 2d at 1122.
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been appropriate where the parcels violating the restriction could equitably
be separated from the main parcel.'
The time for the triggering of the reverter clause must be considered.
Some portions of the main tract were leased prior to being sold. The lease
may trigger the reversion, which may then be barred as a result of the
statute of limitations of laches. However, the date of sale triggers the
reversion for other parcels. These questions were not answered by the
record. Therefore, this was a premature summary judgment.'45
Margate Investment Corp. v. Lupowitz. ' This is an opinion written
by Judge Polen with which Judges Glickstein and Warner concurred. The
question before the court was whether the grantor, under a warranty deed
containing a warranty against encumbrances, would be liable for a breach
of such warranty when the grantor had failed to pay 1980 real estate taxes
which were not assessed until 1985.117 Noting that taxes cannot become
due and give rise to a lien until they are assessed, the court found that the
grantor was not liable under the subject covenant, since the taxes assessed
in 1985 did not encumber the property in 1981 when the warranty deed was
made and delivered. 14
8
Palm Point Property Owners' Ass'n v. Pisarski.149 Justice Kogan
wrote the opinion with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Harding concurred. The matter came to the
Florida Supreme Court from the certified question:
ABSENT A SPECIFIC RULE OF PROCEDURE, DOES A PROPER-
TY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION THAT IS NOT A DIRECT SUCCES-
SOR TO THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPER AND PROVISION
FOR WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE GRANTOR'S ORIGI-
NAL SUBDIVISION SCHEME HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN
AN ACTION TO ENFORCE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS? 50
Palm Point Property Owners' Association sought to enjoin Pisarski
from violating deed restrictions regarding constructing a swimming pool,
stem walls, and docks. Pisarski sought a dismissal, alleging the association
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 638 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
147. Id. at 143.
148. Id. at 144.
149. 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1993).
150. Id. at 195.
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had no standing because it was not a successor in interest to the developer.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the district court affirmed.'51
The supreme court noted the general rule, that a restrictive covenant
can only be enforced by the party whom the covenant was intended to
benefit. 52  There was no intent that these covenants benefit Palm
Point.' Thus, enforcement by the association would be proper only if
the association was a direct successor in interest to the developer, or the
developer expressly assigned to the association the enforcement rights. 54
Neither occurred here. In addition, the supreme court expressly rejected the
theories of associational standing, and homeowners' associations' automatic
standing to enforce covenants as representatives of the associations'
members, without legislative authority."'
Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana'56 Justice Shaw
wrote the opinion with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred. Before the court was
the certified question:
WHETHER THE FLORIDA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
HAS THE EFFECT OF EXTINGUISHING A PLAT RESTRICTION
WHICH WAS CREATED PRIOR TO THE ROOT OF TITLE WHERE
THE MUNIMENTS OF TITLE IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE DE-
SCRIBE THE PROPERTY BY ITS LEGAL DESCRIPTION WHICH
MAKES REFERENCE TO THE PLAT AND THE MUNIMENTS OF
TITLE STATE THAT THE CONVEYANCE IS GIVEN SUBJECT TO
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD. 57
Townsend Construction Corporation and Caruana purchased a parcel
of land in Sunshine Vistas and began construction of a building. The
association sought to enforce a setback restriction contained in a plat
predating the root of title. Townsend and Caruana argued that the
Marketable Record Title Act extinguished the setback restriction, because
it was not specifically identified in the muniments of title beginning with the
151. Id. at 196.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d at 196.
155. Id. at 197.
156. 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993).
157. Id. at 491.
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root of title. 5 The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment.'59
The Third District Court of Appeal agreed. 6
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the results of the lower courts and
answered the certified question in the negative. 6  In doing so, the
supreme court reasoned that Florida's Marketable Record Title Act specifies
that marketable record title will not affect restrictions found in muniments
of title on which the current estate is based beginning with the root of
tile.62 However, the same statute provides an exception where there is a
specific reference in the root of title, the muniments to the book and page
of the recorded instrument give rise to the restriction, or a reference by
name to the plat contains the restriction.'63
In this case, the root of title was a 1951 deed. This deed specifically
referred to Sunshine Vistas, the name of the recorded plat containing the
restriction. Likewise, subsequent deeds, muniments of title, referred to
Sunshine Vistas. Therefore, the court felt that to have held otherwise would
have been to ignore the words in the statute.'"
Sweeney v. Mack.'65 Judge Griffin wrote the opinion with which
Chief Judge Harris and Judge Diamantis concurred. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding that applicable covenants and
restrictions prohibited the construction in question even though the
developer's architectural review committee approved the plans.'66
The Sweeneys purchased a lot in a fly-in development in 1988 and
submitted plans for the construction of their dwelling and hangar to the
developer's designated architectural review committee. The committee
approved the plans and the Sweeneys began constructing their dwelling.
Their neighbors, the Macks, objected to the design and the committee again
reviewed and re-approved the plans. Subsequently, the Macks sought and
obtained an injunction against the Sweeneys. The trial court found the
covenants and restrictions to be clear and unambiguous and the design to
violate the provisions.'67
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sunshine Vistas, 623 So. 2d at 491.
162. Id. at 490.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 492.
165. 625 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1994).
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 16.
Vol. 19
Brown / Grohman
The district court noted that even where a developer or an architectural
review committee retains the absolute power to approve building plans, they
may not act arbitrarily. However, there is no evidence in this case that the
committee's actions were arbitrary.168 Furthermore, even though cove-
nants and restrictions must be construed in favor of the freer use of the
property, the clear and reasonable intent of the parties will be honored.'69
However, where the covenant or restriction is ambiguous, the construction
will go against the party attempting enforcement. 7 The district court
found these provisions to be far from unambiguous, with terms such as
hangar and garage being undefined.'
X. EASEMENTS
Bell v. Cox.'72 Judge Thompson wrote the majority opinion with
which Judge Peterson concurred with opinion and Chief Judge Harris
dissented with opinion. The question before the court was whether Florida's
statutory way of necessity easement provisions found in sections 704.01(2)
and 704.04 of the Florida Statutes were unconstitutional. 73
The question arose from the servient land owner, Bell, who challenged
an award of a statutory way of necessity to Cox for the benefit of his land.
Bell argued that the statute's referring to land "outside any municipality"
denied equal protection under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution
because it created an arbitrary distinction between property outside a
municipality and property inside a municipality. 74
The appellate court affirmed the trial court. 75 In so doing it deter-
mined that the statute did not abridge any fundamental right and did not
affect a suspect class. Therefore, the appellate court determined that the
applicable test was a rational basis standard rather than strict scrutiny. The
inquiry, therefore, was whether there was any conceivable basis on which
the classification bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose. 76 In reviewing the record, the appellate court found that Bell did
not meet the burden of showing that there was no conceivable factual basis
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id.
170. Sweeney, 625 So. 2d at 17.
171. Id.
172. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D962 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1994).
173. Id. at D963.
174. Id.
175. Id. at D964.
176. Id.
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on which the regulation would not relate to a legitimate state purpose.'
Likewise, the court dismissed Bell's challenges of unconstitutionality for not
defining the term "unreasonable refusal" to allow attorney's fees under
section 704.04 and found that the two sections in question were not contrary
to the public policy goal of protecting ecologically sensitive land pursuant
to section 187.201 of the Florida Statutes.78
Chicago Title Insurance v. Florida Inland Navigation District.
179
This is a per curiam opinion with which Chief Judge Dell, Judge Klein and
Senior Judge Owen concurred. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
judgment that a perpetual easement in favor of the United States was not
extinguished either by a patent to Florida, not making the patent subject to
the easement, or by Florida's Marketable Record Title Act.'
Chicago Title sought a judicial declaration that the property, the title
to which it insured, was not subject to a perpetual easement granted by
Florida to the United States. Title to the subject property vested in Florida
in 1850 as a result of the Swamp Lands Act.'' However, the title rights
were inchoate until Florida requested a patent and the United States, in turn,
issued one. These were not done until 1970. Prior to 1970, Florida
conveyed two interests in the property: the perpetual easement to the United
States in 1941, which was recorded in 1942; and in 1953 fee simple title
subject to the perpetual easement to the insured's predecessor in title to said
property prior to 1970.82
Chicago Title argued that the 1970 patent, in not mentioning the
easement, passed fee simple title and the easement to the state which title,
by way of the doctrine of relation, passed to the state's subsequent grant-
ee. "'83 The district court held that the 1970 patent was merely an adminis-
trative action providing only the record evidence of the transfer of title. 8
4
It did, however, perfect the title vested in the state in 1850.85
Alternatively, Chicago Title argued that the 1953 transfer constituted
the root of title under Florida's Marketable Record Title Act. The court
found that the Marketable Record Title Act did not apply to federal property
177. Bell, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at D963.
178. Id. at D964.
179. 635 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
180. Id. at 104-05.
181. Id. at 104.
182. Id. at 105.
183. Id.
184. Chicago Title, 635 So. 2d at 105.
185. Id.
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interests as it would violate the Supremacy Clause extending to Congress the
right to dispose of federal property rights.'86
Colonial Acquisitions, Inc. v. Titus."7 This is an opinion written by
Chief Judge Harris with which Judges Dauksch and Griffin concurred. It
reversed the trial court's finding of an ingress and egress easement and to
remand the matter for a judgment consistent with the Fifth District Court of
Appeal's opinion. 8 '
Since it was clear that the trial court had not found an express
easement, the question was whether one existed through prescription or
necessity. The use was permissive. Therefore, it was not a prescriptive
easement, even though they used the property for over twenty years.89
In addition, even though the land owners closed off access from the alleged
easement holder's property to Highway 50, there was no evidence presented
that there was no reasonable access to their property. Therefore, there was
insufficient evidence to support an easement by necessity. 9 '
Dance v. Tatum. 9' Justice Shaw wrote the opinion with which Chief
Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Grimes, Kogan, and
Harding concurred. The Florida Supreme Court approved the district court's
decision and answered in the negative the following certified question:
WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF MOORINGSASSOCIATION, INC. V TOR-
TOISE ISLAND COMMUNITIES, THE STATEMENT IN ALBRECHT V
DRAKE LUMBER CO., TO THE EFFECT THAT AN IRREVOCABLE
LICENSE BECOMES AN EASEMENT BASED ON EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL, MEANS THAT AN IRREVOCABLE LICENSE CAN NO
LONGER EXIST IN FLORIDA. 192
In 1975, Dance purchased a tract of land. Included in the deal was an
architectural design by the seller for a car dealership. The paving of the
tract required drainage onto an adjacent lot, also owned by the seller, even
though there was no written easement to do so. In 1984, the sellers sold the
adjacent lot to the respondent who sold the parcel to petitioner Dance in
1987, subject to a purchase money mortgage and note. 93 Dance defaulted
186. Id.
187. 636 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
188. Id. at 878.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 629 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1993).
192. Id. at 128 (citations omitted).
193. Id.
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on the note and a foreclosure ensued. Dance did not challenge the judgment
which was entered for Tatum, but argued that he had an easement to the
borrow pit on the adjacent parcel for drainage, even though no written
easement was ever executed between any of the parties.' 94
The trial court held that Dance had an irrevocable drainage license
which survived the foreclosure.' 95 The district court held that the license
was irrevocable but was personal to Dance and could not be transferred. 6
The Florida Supreme Court held that a license sometimes becomes
irrevocable when substantial improvements have been made by the licensee.
However, previous case law holding that such licenses become easements
is in conflict with other case law holding that an easement must be created
by express grant, prescription, or implication.' 97 The supreme court found
that the district court was correct in finding the use of the adjacent parcel
to be an irrevocable license and not an easement. 98
Haight v. Hall.'99 This is a per curiam opinion with which Judges
Ferguson, Jorgenson, and Levy concurred to affirm the trial court's
judgment annulling an easement deed.200 In 1982, Haight attempted to
install an air conditioning unit and a gas tank on his property. Because he
had to comply with setback requirements, Haight sought a perpetual
easement covering a thirty-foot section on the eastern border of his neighbor
Hall's property. In consideration of the easement, Haight paid Hall ten
dollars. Thereafter, he constructed a driveway on her property.20' In
1990, Hall decided to sell the property and, during a title search, the grant
of an easement was discovered. Thus, the buyer refused to purchase unless
the easement was extinguished. Haight refused to relinquish the easement
voluntarily and Hall sought, and was granted, a declaratory judgment
annulling the instrument. Haight appealed.20 2
Hall testified that she granted Haight temporary use of the property.
She admitted to signing a letter granting this temporary use, but claimed she
was fraudulently induced into signing an easement document and that there
were no witnesses or notary present when she signed the purported
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Dance, 629 So. 2d at 128.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 129.
199. 625 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
200. Id. at 1312.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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letter." 3 The notary could not recall the execution of the easement
document and the witnesses to the deed gave conflicting testimony as to its
execution and their witnessing. Furthermore, Haight's wife testified that
when she saw the deed it contained no witnesses or notary.0 4 As a result,
the trial court found Hall's testimony more persuasive.0 5 The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding there to be substantial competent
evidence to support the trial court decision.20 6
Howell v. Miller. °7 This opinion, written by Judge Parker with
Acting Chief Judge Campbell and Judge Fulmer concurring, affirmed the
trial court's awarding an injunction to remove a fence and remanded the
case for further consideration of the servient estate owner's counter-
claim.20 '
The Howells and the Millers owned lots in a subdivision where all lots
have a perpetual nonexclusive road right-of-way easement. Additionally
some lots, including the Howells' and the Millers', had perpetual nonexclu-
sive canal easements.20 9 The Howells constructed a fence across the road
right-of-way easement on their lot, and the Millers filed their suit for
injunctive relief.210 The trial and appellate courts found the fence an
unreasonable interference with the easement.2" The trial court, however,
failed to address the issue in the counterclaim dealing with the scope of the
easement. Thus, the district court affirmed the injunction but remanded the
counterclaim's issues for consideration.
Phelps v. Griffith."3 This is a per curiam opinion with which Acting
Chief Judge Campbell and Judges Parker and Patterson concurred in
reversing the trial court's judgment establishing a prescriptive easement. 214
The Phelps were the owners of an unpaved road, known as Lemon Patch
Road, running across the southernmost portion of their property to the
Griffiths' property. Adjacent to that road was a fifteen-foot wide easement
which was deeded to the Griffiths for ingress and egress to their property.
203. Id.
204. Haight, 625 So. 2d at 1312.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 638 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
208. Id. at 545.
209. Id. at 544.
210. aId
211. Id. at 544-45.
212. Howell, 638 So. 2d at 544-45.
213. 629 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
214. Id. at 305.
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Thus, there were two parallel dirt lanes, with Lemon Patch Road being the
more improved of the two. Phelps fenced off the Lemon Patch Road, which
the Griffiths preferred to use. However, there was no evidence that the use
of the road adversely affected the Phelps, or their use of the property. The
Griffiths brought an action for a prescriptive easement and were awarded
that easement by the trial court,2 5 even though the Phelps took the
position that the use was neither continuous nor adverse to their own
interests, despite the continued use since 1965.216
The appellate court acknowledged the rebuttable presumption that use
is permissive. However, the court took the position that the real inquiry was
whether the use was beneficial to the actual owner or whether it interfered
with the owner's property rights.217 Recognizing that the burden is on the
one alleging the use to be adverse, the appellate court noted that there was
implicit evidence of permissive use and a record devoid of evidence that the
use of the road prevented the Phelps from using the property as they
intended. 218  Therefore, the district court reversed the judgment and
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment
consistent with the appellate court's opinion.219
Water Control District of South Brevard v. Davidson.220 Judge Sharp
wrote the opinion with which Judges Goshom and Peterson concurred. The
court reversed part of a lower court judgment against the Water Control
District ("District"). The lower court ruled that the District had failed to
obtain title to uncultivated and unimproved portions of the disputed lands.
Therefore, the District's claims to the drainage and maintenance easements
on those portions were invalid.22'
The first question addressed was whether the District had acquired title
to the properties. After reviewing the establishment procedure of drainage
districts in general, and analyzing the procedures followed as to this district,
the court concluded that the District was properly formed and had appropri-
ately acquired title to the properties.222
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 306.
218. Phelps, 629 So. 2d at 306.
219. Id.
220. 638 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
221. Id. at 521.
222. Id. at 523.
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The next question was whether the District's interests in the properties
were properly preserved after it acquired title.22  Specifically, the court
had to address whether the Marketable Record Title Act ("MRTA") extingu-
ished the District's interests in the unused portions of the easement.224
Even though the root of title for some portions of the disputed lands referred
to the District's interests, the roots of title to other portions of the disputed
lands did not.225 Therefore, the question was whether the District's ease-
ment interests fell under other MRTA exceptions. Relying on sections
717.03(1) and (5), and 704.05(1) and (3) of the Florida Statutes, the court
found that where the District's interests were in one easement, its partially
using one section of the easement preserves its rights in the entire ease-
ment.226 Therefore, MRTA did not extinguish the District's drainage and
maintenance easement interests.
227
XI. EMINENT DOMAIN
Broward County v. Patel.221 Justice Kogan wrote this unanimous
opinion. The Florida Supreme Court had been asked the following certified
question:
MAY TiE GOVERNMENT SUBMIT EVIDENCE THAT THE
SEVERANCE DAMAGES OF A CONDEMNEE MAY BE CURED
OR LESSENED BY ALTERATIONS TO THE CONDEMNEE'S
PROPERTY WHEN THOSE ALTERATIONS REQUIRE THE
GRANT OF A VARIANCE FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERN-
MENTAL ENTITY HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPER-
TY?
229
The question was answered in the affirmative. The court, relying heavily
upon a treatise, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain,230 pointed out that
the fact that the landowner can probably obtain rezoning of the land has
long been considered relevant evidence in determining a condemnation
award. There is persuasive authority that the reasonable probability of
223. Id. at 525.
224. Id.
225. Water Control Dist. ofS. Brevard, 638 So. 2d at 525.
226. Id at 526.
227. Id.
228. 641 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1994).
229. Id. at 41.
230. JULIUs L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1994).
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obtaining a variance should also be considered relevant evidence.23" ' There
is no reason why it should not be considered relevant evidence in determin-
ing severance damages. The one claiming that the variance could be
obtained would have the burden of proof on the issue. Whether it is
reasonably probable that the variance could be obtained would be a question
of fact.
Once the reasonable probability of the variance being obtained had
been determined, then the amount of damages is the question. The proper
test is "the price that would be paid by a knowledgeable buyer willing but
not obligated to buy, to a knowledgeable owner willing but not obliged to
sell. '232 That would have the effect of properly factoring into the price
the possibility, however remote, that the variance might be denied. In this
case, the trial court had erred in calculating damages. It had awarded
damages lower than those testified to by any of the expert witnesses,
including the government's expert witness. Thus, its decision was not
supported by substantial competent evidence. Secondly, the possibility of
obtaining a variance was treated as a certainty. Finally, the costs involved
in adapting the property to take advantage of the variance were not included
in the damages.
American Dive Center, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation.233
This was a per curiam opinion with which Judges Hersey, Polen, and
Stevenson concurred. American Dive Center purchased another dive shop
in 1989. The shop was never closed but the name was changed. In 1990,
the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") began the condemnation
of an area which included the location of the dive shop. American Dive
Center sought lost business damages but, to receive them, the business
would have to be "an established business of more than 5 years' stand-
ing. 234 The trial court granted summary judgment to the DOT on the
basis that American Dive Center did not qualify.
235
The district court reversed. 236 The supreme court had established that
in such cases "[t]he essential inquiry ... is whether there was 'continuous
operation of the business at the location where the business damages [were]
231. Patel, 641 So. 2d at 42-43. Consequently, the supreme court disapproved Williams
v. State, Dep't of Transp., 579 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) and State, Dep't of
Transp. v. Byrd, 254 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1971). Id.
232. Id. at 43.
233. 632 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
234. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1989).
235. American Dive, 632 So. 2d at 278.
236. Id. at 279.
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alleged to have been suffered."'237  Whether the current owner had
operated the business that was there for five years was not the issue. The
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the record did not
conclusively show that a dive shop had not been operated at that site for
five years.
Bolduc v. Glendale Federal Bank. 3' Judge Pariente wrote the
opinion with which Chief Judge Dell and Judge Glickstein concurred. This
case did not follow the normal order of proceedings for a condemnation of
leased property. One tenant entered into a stipulated final judgment for its
full damages. The other tenant had a jury trial to determine its total
condemnation award, including business damages. Thereafter, the owner
settled with the DOT. Subsequently, the tenants sought the apportionment
of the owner's award and won. The trial court granted them the "'bonus
value' of their leasehold interests in the condemned property."2"'
The district court reversed, however.4 Had the tenants followed the
normal procedure, the value of the property would have been determined
first. A subsequent hearing would have been held to apportion the award
according to the respective rights of the claimants. But the tenants here had
taken other quicker routes to get full recovery. They were not entitled to
more than that. The effect of the apportionment was to allow the tenants
a double recovery. That was impermissible. This case should serve as a
warning to tenants faced With condemnation.
Broward County v. Ellington.24' Chief Judge Dell wrote the opinion.
Judge Glickstein and Senior Judge Owen, William C., Jr., concurred. A
consultant had been hired by the county to forecast the future needs of the
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and had concluded that
additional land should be acquired to meet the airport's needs and to
minimize noise conflicts with the surrounding communities. A second
consultant was hired to determine how much additional property to acquire.
Acting on these reports, the county began to buy the properties west of the
airport. When one landowner would not sell, the county brought this
eminent domain suit. Even though the landowner did not present any
witnesses, the trial court found in his favor because it had concluded that the
237. Id. at 278 (quoting Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. K.E. Morris
Allignment Serv. Inc., 444 So. 2d 926, 930 (1983)).
238. 631 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
239. Id. at 1128.
240. Id. at 1129.
241. 622 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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county had enough land for the airport's needs and that the land was not
being taken for a public purpose.242
The district court reversed.243 The trial court was right in that private
property may only be taken for a public purpose, but limiting uses which are
incompatible with the operation of an airport is a public purpose.244 The
trial court was also right in that private property may not be taken unless the
taking is necessary to accomplish the public purpose. But the "necessity"
requirement is of a reasonable necessity, not an absolute one. For the
uninitiated, that may seem confusing. "Necessity" is an absolute term.
How can it be modified to be less than absolute? The critical question is:
necessary for what? As this case illustrates, that question may make
necessary seem like a relative rather than an absolute term.
The Florida Supreme Court has provided a two-tier test to determine
if property can be taken.245 First, the condemning authority must show it
has a reasonable need for the condemnation. The Director of Planning and
Development for the county's Aviation Department had testified that, in
order to guarantee that commercial uses in this area would be airport related,
the land must be taken by the government and subjected to the government's
development scheme before being leased or sold for commercial use. The
Director's conclusions were based upon studies by the consultants. The use
was consistent with the county's master plan. That amounted to substantial
competent evidence of the reasonable need, so it was enough to satisfy the
first tier.
Once the first tier has been satisfied, the burden shifts. The second tier
requires the challenger to show that the government has acted illegally, in
bad faith, or has grossly abused its discretion. Here, the challenger had not
submitted any evidence, so it failed to establish its affirmative defense.
City of Cocoa v. Holland Properties, Inc.246 Judge Peterson wrote
the opinion with which Judges Goshorn and Thompson concurred. This
case also involved the question of reasonable necessity and the Fifth District
Court of Appeal relied on Ellington.2 47 The first tier of the two-tier test
required the condemnor to show that it had a reasonable need to take the
242. Id. at 1030-31.
243. Id. at 1032.
244. See Test v. Broward County, 616 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
245. See City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1977).
246. 625 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 624 (Fla.
1994).
247. Ellington, 622 So. 2d at 1029.
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property. Under Broward County v. Steele,2 41 the quantum of proof
required to satisfy the first tier is the introduction of "some evidence
showing reasonable necessity for taking. 2 49 The land was to be used for
well sites and the city had obtained permits for the consumption of water to
be produced from the St. Johns River Water Management District. The trial
court then held a hearing to determine whether events since the issuance of
the permit had eliminated the necessity, and decided that there was no
necessity. The district court, however, concluded that this was an error. °
The issuance of the use permit was enough to satisfy the first tier. The
evidence at the hearing would be relevant to the second tier, in order to
determine whether the condemning authority had acted in bad faith or
abused its discretion.
The legislature has revised certain procedural aspects of chapter 73 of
the Florida Statutes.2"' It has provided that section 73.032 shall be the
"exclusive offer of judgment provisions for eminent domain actions. '' 52
It provides the time when offers of judgment must be made and the
technical requirements of such offers. Sections on costs253 and on attor-
ney's fees254 were also modified, the most notable change being a sched-
ule for determining the fee based on the benefit produced.
XII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Hughes Supply, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation."
Chief Judge Harris wrote the majority opinion with which Judges Sharp and
Peterson concurred. 6 Hughes operated a fuel storage facility and paid
the annual premiums to participate in the Florida Petroleum Liability
Insurance and Restoration Program. Subsequently, Hughes discovered a
discharge of diesel fuel coming from one of its storage tanks. Hughes
reported the leak to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation.
The Department ordered the tank drained. Hughes, however, neglected to
drain the tank in a timely manner. Thus, the Department denied Hughes
248. 537 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
249. City of Cocoa, 625 So. 2d at 19 (quoting Steele, 537 So. 2d at 651-52).
250. Id. at 20-21.
251. Act of May 11, 1994, ch. 94-162, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 564 (amending FLA. STAT.
§§ 73.032, .091, .092 (1993)).
252. See id. at 565.
253. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993).
254. Id. § 73.092.
255. 622 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
256. Id. at 1057.
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coverage for the restoration; as it determined that Hughes was not in
substantial compliance with chapter 376 of the Florida Statutes."7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the Department's determina-
tion." 8 The court reasoned that the owner need be knowledgeable of the
rules but cannot rely on others for guidance. An instruction for drainage,
while not ordered to be immediate, must, according to the rules, be
accomplished within three days of discovering the leak. Hughes' actions
failed to comply with the provisions required. 9
Young v. Department of Community Affairs.260 Justice Harding wrote
the majority opinion with which Justices Overton and Grimes concurred,
Chief Justice Barkett concurred specially with an opinion with which
Justices Shaw and Kogan concurred, and Justice Kogan concurred with an
opinion with which Justice Shaw concurred in result only, and from which
Justice McDonald dissented with an opinion.26' In rendering its opinion,
the supreme court answered the Third District Court of Appeal's certified
question by holding "that when the state land planning agency initiates a
proceeding before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission
pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1987), that agency carries both
the ultimate burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward. 262
In 1988, the Youngs applied for clearing permits on Big Pine Key.
Monroe County granted the permits and transmitted copies to the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs as required. The Department appealed those
permits to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. The
Youngs failed to participate at an administrative hearing because the
Commission ruled that they had the burden of proof. The Commission
denied the permits.2 63  Although the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the Commission's denial, the supreme court quashed the decision
and remanded the matter for a new hearing before a hearing officer.264 In
so doing, the supreme court reasoned that the effect of the Department's
purported appeal to the Commission was really a request to stay the
effectiveness of an otherwise valid county order. Therefore, since it was the
Department which asserted that the proposed development failed to comply
257. Id. at 1059.
258. Id. at 1061.
259. Id. at 1060.
260. 625 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1994).
261. Id. at 831.
262. Id. at 835.
263. Id. at 832.
264. Id. at 835.
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with chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes, the Department should bear the
burden.26
XIII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Jordan v. Boisvert.2" Judge Joanos wrote the opinion with which
Judges Miner and Kahn concurred. The parties signed an agreement for the
sale of real property. The contract included a description of the property
and a sketch, but provided for a survey to determine the exact legal
description. Three surveys were conducted, each different due to the uncer-
tainty as to which of several willow trees was intended to be a critical
monument. When the parties could not agree on a legal description, the
buyer brought this action for specific performance.
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of relief.
Pointing out that the "trial court's judgments are entitled to a presumption
of correctness,"267 it added that
[t]he fact that the surveyor performed three surveys, each of which
varied the boundary lines of the property at issue, constitutes substantial
evidence to support the trial court's finding that even considering the
description in the contract for sale, attached drawing, and extrinsic
evidence, the description was insufficient to permit a surveyor to
establish the boundaries of the property.268
Since the exact property could not be identified, there had been no meeting
of the minds. Consequently, there was no contract.
The trial court had reserved jurisdiction to determine the attorney's fees
to be awarded. The district court found this to be an error because the basis
for the award was the attorney's fees provision in the contract.269 Since
the contract did not exist, logically fees could not be awarded under one of
its terms.
Long v. Moore.270 This is a per curiam decision with which Judges
Smith, Kahn, and Lawrence concur. The Longs bought a home for
$100,000 from the Moores. The terms were $50,000 down with the sellers
taking back a $50,000 purchase money mortgage. When the Longs could
265. Young, 625 So. 2d at 835.
266. 632 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
267. Id. at 256.
268. Id. at 257.
269. Id.
270. 626 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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not make the payments, Mr. Moore took them to the courthouse where they
executed a deed conveying the property back to the Moores. Apparently,
the Longs were allowed to remain in possession under a lease. Subsequent-
ly, the Moores filed an action to recover unpaid rent and evict the Longs
from the property. The Longs counterclaimed for rescission of both the
original sale and the subsequent reconveyance, and for the imposition of an
equitable lien on the property.27'
The rescission claim was based upon Mr. Long being a paranoid
schizophrenic. This condition prevented him from understanding the nature
and effect of this long-term real estate transaction, even though he was able
to comprehend the arithmetic involved. A conveyance to or from a party
under such mental disability would be voidable. However, this author
cannot help but wonder who, besides Mr. Long, constituted the "Longs."
Presumably, it was Mrs. Long. But there was no mention of her existence,
or her mental capacity or condition. The existence of a competent co-
grantee or co-grantor would certainly seem to be relevant to the issue of
rescission.
A critical issue in granting rescission was whether the court would be
able to return the parties to the status quo ante. Here, it appears that the
Moores were not in a position to return the down-payment to the Longs.
However, the court notes that it would be sufficient to fashion an equitable
remedy "which would be fair to both parties." '272 An example provided
is to subject the property to an equitable lien in favor of the Longs for
whatever amount the trial court subsequently determines is due to them.
Zanakis v. Zanakis.273 The opinion was written by Judge Klein and
concurred with by Judge Hersey and Senior Judge Owen, William C., Jr.
This case involved the imposition of a constructive trust and the clarification
of the terms "resulting trust" and "constructive trust." The mother of two
sons owned property. She quitclaimed the property to herself and her
responsible son so they would hold it as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship. The purpose of the transfer was to hold the property for the
other son who had problems with drugs and alcohol.
When the problem son was killed, the responsible son abandoned his
wife and moved in with his late brother's widow. They later married. A
dispute arose with his mother, so the "responsible" son quitclaimed the
property to his new wife. She brought this action for partition. Granting
271. Id. at 1388.
272. Id. at 1389.
273. 629 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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the mother's counterclaim, the trial court "imposed a resulting trust"274 on
the property for the benefit of the mother.
A constructive trust is a remedy imposed by the court of equity to
avoid unjust enrichment, even though it is not what the parties intended. In
contrast, a resulting trust arises because that is what the parties intended and
equity regards the substance rather than the form of a transaction. The trial
judge correctly recognized that this was a situation for a resulting trust,
although to characterize it as "impos[ing] a resulting trust" '275 would be
incorrect. This resulting trust arose upon the delivery of the deed by the
mother because the parties intended the title to be held for the benefit of the
problem son. However, the result was correct even if the labeling was not.
The "responsible" son also argued that the parol evidence rule should
have prevented the admission of evidence regarding a resulting or construc-
tive trust. The district court correctly rejected that argument.276 It is, as
the court stated, "well-established . . . that constructive or resulting trusts
involving real estate can be based on parol evidence." '277
The parol evidence rule provides that the terms of an integrated
agreement may not be contradicted by proof of a prior or contemporaneous
oral agreement or an earlier tentative draft.27 In this resulting trust, there
was no attempt to vary the terms of the deed. The legal title was vested in
the grantee exactly as the deed specified. However, equity recognized that
the parties intended an additional consistent term, that the "responsible" son,
the legal title holder, hold that title in trust. Similarly, the parol evidence
rule is inapplicable to a constructive trust. The constructive trust is not
based upon a prior or contemporaneous agreement. It is not based upon any
agreement. It is a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.
XIV. HOMESTEAD
Hubert v. Hubert.279  Judge Klein wrote the majority opinion with
which Judges Anstead and Senior Judge Owen, William C., Jr., concurred.
The court reversed a trial court order establishing that the appellant's
remainder interest in his deceased father's homestead was not exempt from
274. Id. at 182.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 183.
277. Id.
278. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, ch. 3
(3d ed. 1987).
279. 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 624
(Fla. 1994).
19941
Nova Law Review
the levy of creditors because his remainder was subject to a life estate in
someone other than the decedent's heirs.280
Decedent was survived by two sons, Donald and Richard. The father
bequeathed to Donald the entire estate, except for a present life estate in the
homestead to his father's friend or until the father's friend remarried.
Richard was a judgment creditor of the estate and maintained that the
remainder was not exempt. Richard's theory was that the homestead lost its
exempt status when the decedent bequeathed a life estate to someone other
than an heir. Donald argued that if the current life estate had been held by
a surviving spouse, his interest would still be exempt. Likewise, a vested
remainder interest can be granted to a lineal descendant and a life estate
given to the surviving spouse, while both of them are protected. The trial
court agreed with Richard.28' The district court ruled that while the home-
stead protection did not inure to the life estate, it did inure to the remainder
interest. 8 2
Jacobs v. Jacobs. 3 Judge Cobb wrote the majority opinion revers-
ing and remanding the trial court's awarding attorney's fees. Judge Dauksch
concurred and Judge Griffen concurred with an opinion. In determining the
attorney's fee issue, the court had to decide whether Mary Jacobs' position
was frivolous. In essence, she claimed that she could waive her homestead
rights after her spouse passed away and that it would have the same effect
as if she had waived her homestead rights while he was alive.284
Jake and Mary Jacobs married in 1954. Jake had four children from
a previous marriage and Mary had one child from a previous marriage. Jake
had a piece of property titled solely in his name. In 1984, he executed a
will which devised all of his property as follows: 30% to Mary and 70%
to his children and stepson. However, in 1989, Jake executed a warranty
deed of the property to Mary. After his death, Mary attempted to rescind
the deed, stating that Jake did not have the mental capacity to execute it.
The trial court denied recission and the four stepchildren demanded and
received attorney's fees on the ground that the action was frivolous. Their
contention was that Mary would fair the same regardless of whether the
property was received through deed or by homestead.285
280. Id. at 1049.
281. Id. at 1050.
282. Id. at 1051.
283. 633 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
284. Id. at 31.
285. Id.
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Mary argued that she could have taken under Jake's will, rather than
accept the life estate in the homestead property under Florida law. Mary
never executed a waiver of her rights to the homestead property, either
before or during the marriage. Jake could not devise his property other than
to a surviving spouse. The question was whether he could devise in part.
According to the appellate court, there should be no impediment of a spouse
choosing to accept less than 100% of the fee or the life estate. The only
issue was the attorney's fees, as such, the argument was not frivolous and
the award of fees was reversed.8 6
King v. Ellison."7 Judge Polen wrote the majority opinion with
which Judge Dell and Senior Judge Walden, James H., concurred. The
court affirmed the trial court's dismissing with prejudice a complaint seeking
a declaratory decree that the testators became the constructive trustees of the
subject property for all of the children and stepchildren named in the
will.288 In so doing, the district court certified the following question:
WHETHER SECTION 732.401(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991),
WHICH VESTS A REMAINDER INTEREST IN HOMESTEAD
PROPERTY IN LINEAL DESCENDANTS, IS UNCONSTITUTION-
AL WHEN APPLIED .TO DEFEAT A TESTATOR'S INTENT TO
DEVISE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY EQUALLY TO ADULT
STEPCHILDREN AS WELL AS ADULT LINEAL DESCEN-
DANTS?28 9
King is the natural daughter of Florence Calhoun, and Ellison is the
natural daughter of Hubert Calhoun. Florence and Hubert were married and
executed wills devising their individual estates to all of their children and
stepchildren to share and share alike. After Florence died, Hubert married
Rosemarie. Two years later Hubert died, leaving Rosemarie with a life
estate and the remainder in Hubert's lineal descendant, Ellison. Appellants
purchased the life estate from Rosemarie. King argued that the remarriage
should not cause the lineal descendants of Florence to be divested of what
was their and their natural mother's home. King asked at trial for the
appellees to be named as constructive trustees of the property and be given
proportional credit for the purchase price of the life estate. King argued that
286. Id. at 32.
287. 622 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 632 So. 21 1026
(Fla. 1994).
288. Id. at 600.
289. Id.
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section 732.401 of the Florida Statutes was unconstitutional as the adult
children of Hubert were benefitted over the wishes contained in Florence's
will. The trial court dismissed the complaint.290
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, while finding merit in King's
argument, failed to agree that the state has no legitimate interest in vesting
the remainder in adult descendants. Therefore, it certified the above
question to the Florida Supreme Court.29'
LaBelle v. LaBelle.292 Judge Cobb wrote the majority opinion with
which Judge Thompson and Associate Judge Hauser concurred. Dorothy
LaBelle was permitted to intervene in the dissolution involving her ex-
husband Rupert and his then wife Carmel without objection from either
party. Rupert fraudulently used Dorothy's funds to obtain a residence which
he claimed was protected from a constructive trust since it was his home-
stead.293 Since the homestead protection does not apply to properties
which are purchased with traceable fraudulently obtained funds, Rupert
could not validly rely on the homestead protection.294
Sigmund v. Elder.295 Judge Smith wrote the opinion with which
Judges Ervin and Allen concurred. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's finding that a deed executed by the decedent to
himself and his wife to create a tenancy by the entirety in homestead
property was void ab initio under the 1885 Florida Constitution since the
surviving wife did not join in the execution. 296 At trial, Ruth was found
to possess a life estate with the surviving adult children possessing the
remainder interest.297
The district court rejected the surviving spouse's arguments that the
Marketable Record Title Act should cure the problem and that section
689.11 of the Florida Statutes permitted such a transfer, since the constitu-
tional requirements controlled.29
290. Id. at 599.
291. Id. at 600.
292. 624 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
293. Id. at 742.
294. Id.
295. 631 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
296. Id. at 330.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 331.
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XV. INSURANCE
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County.299
This is a per curiam opinion from an appeal heard before Chief Judge
Schwartz and Judges Baskin and Levy. The question before the court was
whether the replacement cost homeowner's insurance policy in question
would provide coverage for the cost of complying with the county's
requirement that homeowners, after the impact of Hurricane Andrew, make
structural improvements to their houses to bring them into compliance with
the South Florida Building Code including, bfit not limited to, elevating the
houses to conform to the county's flood elevation requirements."'
Noting that the construction of ambiguities in an insurance policy is a
question of law, the court found that the language in question was not
ambiguous and needed no construction." ' The policy in question was not
subject to more than one interpretation. It first excluded enforcement of an
ordinance or law regulating construction or repair of a structure. It provided
that there would be no insurance for losses or increased costs associated
with the enforcement to be in compliance with construction laws or
regulations. Therefore, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in
finding the policy and its exclusions ambiguous and unclear as a matter of
law.3
0 2
XVI. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G..S.
Corp.3 0 3 Justice Grimes wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett
and Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, Harding, and Senior Justice McDonald
concurred. Chief Justice Barkett also wrote a brief concurrence, in which
Justice Kogan concurred, to clarify that total takings and temporary takings
were not the only categories of unconstitutional takings possible. Until
1990, when it was declared unconstitutional in Joint Ventures, Inc. v. State,
Department of Transportation,304 a statute0 5 had allowed certain agen-
cies to designate privately owned land as being reserved for road construc-
299. 639 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
300. Id. at 64.
301. Id. at 65.
302. Id. at 66.
303. 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994), opinion clarified, 1994 WL 275841 (Fla. Apr. 7, 1994).
304. 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
305. FLA. STAT. § 337.241 (1987).
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tion. No building permits could be issued for new construction or for
substantial renovation of nonresidential structures for at least five years on
land so designated. Two landowners claimed, in inverse condemnation
suits, that they were entitled to compensation because the designation of
their land had amounted to a taking, a temporary taking during the period
between the land's designation and decision striking down the statute which
allowed the designation. In the trial court, the landowners prevailed on a
motion for summary judgment and the district court affirmed," 6 but
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
WHETHER ALL LANDOWNERS WITH PROPERTY INSIDE THE
BOUNDARIES OF INVALIDATED MAPS OF RESERVATION
UNDER SUBSECTIONS 337.241(2) AND (3), FLORIDA STATUTES
(1987), ARE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PER SE DECLA-
RATIONS OF TAKING AND JURY TRIALS TO DETERMINE JUST
COMPENSATION.
The supreme court responded with a negative answer.
The crux of the problem was that the supreme court had not clearly
stated the basis for its decision in Joint Ventures. 117 If the basis for
invalidating the statute had been its violation of the taking clause, then
compensation would have been required and the only issue in question
would have been the amount. However, if the basis had been the violation
of the Due Process Clause, then no compensation would be required unless
provided for by a statute.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Joint Ventures relied upon
a due process violation because: the plaintiffs had not sought compensation
for a taking; the court's analysis had focused on the method, not the effect
of the statute; and the decision was to invalidate the statute, not to require
the agency to choose between abandoning its action or providing compensa-
tion.3"8 Thus, the relief sought, the court's analysis, and the court's
conclusion were all consistent with a due process violation.
The conclusion would not necessarily deprive the plaintiffs of relief.
It merely deprived them of a head start in their litigation. Because the
taking had already been established in the earlier case, on remand the
306. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 608 So. 2d 52
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 621 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993), and quashed by
640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
307. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 622.
308. Tampa-Hillsborough, 640 So. 2d at 57-58.
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plaintiffs would have to prove that their land had, in fact, been taken during
the period that it was designated as being reserved for road construction.
Palm Beach County v. Wright."9 Chief Justice Grimes wrote the
opinion with which Senior Justice McDonald and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. The Palm Beach County Comprehensive
Plan ("Plan") included a section on traffic circulation. On a map, it identi-
fied transportation corridors for new roads or the expansion of existing
roads. The Plan prohibited the granting of any permits for development
within the corridors which would interfere with the future roadway
construction. Owners of property along an existing road challenged the
constitutionality of the Plan because the map showed that part of their land
would be the site of possible future road widening. The constitutionality of
this part of the Plan was attacked based upon the precedent of Joint
Ventures10 in which the supreme court had declared a similar statute3 '
unconstitutional. The issue was presented to the supreme court in the form
of the following certified question:
IS A COUNTY THOROUGHFARE MAP DESIGNATING CORRI-
DORS FOR FUTURE ROADWAYS, AND WHICH FORBIDS LAND
USE ACTIVITY THAT WOULD IMPEDE FUTURE CONSTRUC-
TION OF A ROADWAY, ADOPTED INCIDENT TO A COMPRE-
HENSIVE COUNTY LAND USE PLAN ENACTED UNDER THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION ACT, FACIALLY UNCON-
STITUTIONAL UNDER Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation?
1 2
The supreme court provided a negative answer. The statute in Joint
Ventures had been found to violate the Due Process Clause, not the taking
clause. 3 Consequently, it could not be used as the basis for a claim that
a taking per se had occurred.
Furthermore, the supreme court concluded that this ordinance did not,
on its face, violate the Due Process Clause.314 Comprehensive planning
for future growth protects the public and is, consequently, a proper exercise
309. 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
310. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 622 (FIa. 1990); see also A.G. WS. Corp., 608 So.
2d at 52.
311. FLA. STAT. § 337.241 (1987).
312. Wright, 641 So. 2d at 51 (citation omitted).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 53.
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of the police power. That planning must logically include plans to handle
increased traffic. Thus, a legitimate state interest was substantially
advanced. While the statute in Joint Ventures was intended only to depress
the price that the public would have to pay if it eventually took the land,
this ordinance was intended to ensure that future development would be
compatible with the Comprehensive Plan. It provided the county flexibility
in dealing with placement of the roads and issuance of permits to offset
particular hardships. Moreover, most land adjacent to the corridors would
increase in value, giving its owners benefits to offset any loss.
The court recognized that some landowners may suffer harm due to
their particular circumstances. 3'5 They would be able to claim that they
had suffered from a taking. But the court went on to remind readers that:
the landowner's entire parcel would be considered in making that determina-
tion; a taking would only occur when the landowner had been deprived of
substantially all economically beneficial use of the land; and such a claim
would probably be premature until a landowner had been denied a
development permit.316
Department of Transportation v. Gefen.317 Chief Justice Grimes
wrote the unanimous opinion. The landowner's property fronted on a street
on which there were access ramps to the interstate highway. When the
access ramps were closed, the property decreased in value as a commercial
site. The landowner brought this inverse condemnation action for compen-
sation for his loss and prevailed at trial and before the district court. The
supreme court reversed, answering in the negative the following certified
question:
WHETHER AN OWNER OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY HAS
SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE TAKING WHERE ACCESS TO AN
INTERSTATE HIGHWAY BY MEANS OF A STREET FRONTING
ON APPELLEE'S PROPERTY IS CLOSED, AND SAID CLOSING
RESULTS IN SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED ACCESS TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, ALTHOUGH NO ACCESS FROM ABUT-
TING STREETS HAS BEEN CLOSED.""
315. Id.
316. Id. at 54.
317. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
318. Id. at 1345.
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The supreme court found that Palm Beach County v. Tessler319 was
distinguishable from Gefen. In Tessler, the court held that an inverse
condemnation action might lie for substantial loss of access even though
none of the landowner's property is appropriated. However, in this case,
access to a public road was not diminished, i.e., there was no loss of access.
The harm was caused by a diminution in traffic flow along the fronting
road. That was not a compensable loss.320
More interesting is the dicta in this case. The Department has plans to
condemn a portion of this land at some time in the future. When it does
happen, the Department will not be allowed to take advantage of the value
reduction which resulted from its having closed the access ramps. The court
held that would be like a condemning authority trying to take advantage of
the decrease in property values caused by the announcement of its plans to
condemn, which has long been prohibited.321
Alexander v. Town of Jupiter.322 Judge Warner wrote the opinion
with which Judges Anstead and Gunther concurred. Landowner applied for
a permit to clear property so that a survey could be conducted. The permit
was refused because zoning ordinances had not yet been adopted to conform
the zoning to the comprehensive plan. It took over two years to obtain the
permit. The landowner sued, inter alia, for temporary taking of her
property. The trial court rejected the claim based upon the ripeness
doctrine.323 It reasoned that the original denial was not a final decision
on the application.
The district court disagreed and reversed. 24 A claim of permanent
taking would be precluded by the ripeness doctrine. But the claim here was
for compensation for a temporary taking. It would turn on whether the
delay was reasonable, i.e., merely a normal delay associated with the public
land use planning process or not. As a statute required inconsistencies
between zoning and the comprehensive plan be resolved within one
year,325 the district court concluded that a temporary taking might have
occurred here.326
319. 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1989).
320. See State, Dep't of Transp. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1981).
321. See Dade County v. Still, 377 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1979); State v. Chicone, 158 So.
2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
322. 640 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
323. See Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (adopting the federal ripeness doctrine).
324. Alexander, 640 So. 2d at 83.
325. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202 (1985).
326. Alexander, 640 So. 2d at 83.
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Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Flotilla, Inc.327
Chief Judge Frank wrote the opinion with which Judges Ryder and Patterson
concurred. A bald eagle nest was discovered in the 173 acres which a
developer had bought. Development within 750 feet of the nest was
prohibited until inspectors concluded, three years later, that the eagles had
abandoned the nest. The developer sued, claiming that his land had been
taken. The Second District Court of Appeal disagreed.
First, the court pointed out that the nature of the claim was that a
regulatory taking had occurred. 328  The government had not physically
taken the property. One factor to be considered was "whether the regulation
precludes all economically reasonable use of the property. 32 9 In this case,
the development was to proceed in six phases, but protection of the eagle's
nest only delayed one phase. The developer "retained the desired use of the
majority of its land; most of the property was developed. Because the
property as a whole retained an economic life, we cannot agree that the land
use restrictions are compensable. 33°
The court went on to point out that "[t]he government neither owns nor
controls the migration of the wildlife species it protects. 33' Consequently,
"[o]f the few courts that have encountered this question, most agree that the
government owes no compensation for and may constitutionally protect
wildlife whose unwanted occupation on private land arguably diminishes the
market value of that land.""33 It seems to be suggesting that compensation
would never be required where the regulation is for the protection of
wildlife. It is doubtful that such a sweeping rule should, or could, ever
develop.
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Non Lawyer Preparation of and
Representation Of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictions.333 Last
year, the Florida Supreme Court decided to conduct an experiment. For one
year, it would allow property managers to complete, sign, and file com-
327. 636 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
328. Id. at 764.
329. Id. (relying upon Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla.
1981), cert. deniedsub noma. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981)).
330. Id. at 765.
331. Id.
332. Florida Game, 636 So. 2d at 765-66.
333. 627 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
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plaints and motions for defaule34 using approved forms335 in uncontested
residential evictions for nonpayment of rent. Further, in uncontested cases,
property managers could also obtain final judgments and writs of possession.
But the terms "property manager" and "uncontested residential eviction" had
not been defined.
The supreme court, after reviewing numerous comments and sugges-
tions, decided that, for the purpose of this experiment, a property manager
would be "one who is responsible for the day-to-day management of the
residential rental property, as evidenced by such factors as responsibility for
renting of units, maintenance of rental property, and collection of rent. 336
A corporate manager could qualify under this definition. The manager must
have written authorization from the landlord to perform these responsibili-
ties.
A case would be considered contested, for the purposes of this
experiment, when a hearing was scheduled. Once a hearing is scheduled in
a case, the landlord will have to hire an attorney for representation or the
landlord will have to go to the hearing himself.
Hillman Construction Corp. v. Wainer.337  Judge Farmer wrote the
opinion with which Judges Glickstein and Pariente concurred. A tenant had
hired a general contractor to improve the rental property. The contractor
had not been paid and the tenant had filed bankruptcy. The landlord
regained possession and rented the premises to a new tenant. The contractor
filed an action against the landlord for unjust enrichment based upon the
allegations that the improvements enhanced the value of the premises and
allowed the landlord to charge the new tenant a higher rent. The trial court
had dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the district court reversed. 338
In so doing, the district court stated:
The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: (1)
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge
thereof; (2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit
conferred; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequita-
334. The Florida Barre Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of and Representation
of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictions, 605 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1992), opinion
clarified, 627 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1993); see Ronald Brown, Real Property: 1993 Survey of
Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 389, 398 (1993).
335. See The Florida Bar re Approval of Forms Pursuant to Rule 10-1.1 (b) of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 591 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991).
336. Advisory Opinion, 627 So. 2d at 487.
337. 636 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
338. Id. at 577.
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ble for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value
thereof to the plaintiff.339
The facts in plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged these elements. The
court emphasized that it was not ruling on the merits of the claim. It was
only deciding that if the plaintiff managed to prove what it had alleged, then
theoretically it might prevail.
The plaintiff had also made a claim for an equitable lien based upon
the same facts. The trial court had also dismissed that claim and, in a
footnote, the district court agreed.340
It is interesting that the case did not involve a construction lien;34
perhaps the contractor had not complied with the statutory requirements for
obtaining one. A construction lien can attach to the landlord's interest if the
improvements are made in accordance with the terms of the lease. 42
However, the landlord may protect its property from construction liens by
1) having the lease provide that construction liens will not attach to the
landlord's interest and 2) recording the lease or a notice of that clause if all
leases on this property include the same clause.343 If the lease specifically
provided that no construction lien could attach and the contractor had notice,
even constructive notice, of that, it would seem inequitable to allow the
contractor to circumvent the spirit of that agreement by recovering under the
unjust enrichment theory.
Homeowner's Corp. of River Trails v. Saba.34 4 Judge Altenbemd
wrote the opinion with which Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Judge Patterson
concurred. A homeowners/tenants association had challenged an increase
in the lot rentals. When mediation failed, the association filed an action to
have the rent increase declared unreasonable. Section 723.033(1) of the
Florida Statutes provides:
If the court, as a matter of law, finds a mobile home lot rental amount,
rent increase, or change, or any provision of the rental agreement, to be
unreasonable, the court may: (a) Refuse to enforce the lot rental
agreement. (b) Refuse to enforce the rent increase or change. (c)
Enforce the remainder of the lot rental agreement without the unreason-
able provision. (d) Limit the application of the unreasonable provision
339. Id.
340. Id. at 577 n.1.
341. See FLA. STAT. ch. 713, pt. 1 (1993).
342. Id. § 713.10.
343. Id.
344. 626 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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so as to avoid any unreasonable result. (e) Award a refund or a
reduction in future rent payments. (f) Award such other equitable relief
as deemed necessary. 45
The trial judge, however, entered a partial final judgment based upon a
finding that the statute was unconstitutional on its face for a number of
reasons, including: 1) that it violated the due process clause of the Florida
Constitution; 346 2) that it violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution;147 3) that it was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority; 348 and, 4) that it was a per se taking of private
property without payment of just compensation in violation of both the
Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution. 349  The district
court found the conclusions to be premature.350 The questions involved
both law and fact, but the trial court had not heard any evidence.
It also pointed out that this was not a rent control statute in the
traditional sense. Such statutes require landlords to rent at below market
prices and are justified by an emergency. But this statute only would
prevent rent that was in excess of the market rate.35' Consequently, this
statute could not be invalidated on the basis that there was no legislative
finding of an emergency.
Hutchinson v. Kimzay of Florida, Inc.352 Judge Thompson wrote the
opinion with which Judge Peterson concurred specially, without opinion.
Judge Griffin concurred in part, but dissented in part. Kimzay had a long
term ground lease. The ground rent would escalate when one of the
following events occurred: twenty-five years had expired or Kimzay was
no longer the largest subtenant. Hutchinson claimed that the latter had
occurred and sent Kimzay a twenty-day notice of default because the rent
payment was inadequate. When the increased payments were not made, the
landlord sent a three-day notice letter demanding the rent due or possession
of the property353
The tenant in this case was in an odd situation. The rent was to be
adjusted according to the Commodity Price Index, which no longer existed.
345. FLA. STAT. § 723.033(1) (1991).
346. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
347. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
348. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. III, § I.
349. Id. art. X, § 6.
350. Saba, 626 So. 2d at 275.
351. See FLA. STAT. § 723.033(4) (1993).
352. 637 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
353. Id. at 943.
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So the rent could not be determined with certainty and yet the tenant was
being threatened with eviction for nonpayment of the correct amount. The
tenant then filed suit for a declaratory judgment on the amount of the rent
and also for an injunction to prevent the landlord pursuing the eviction until
the amount had been determined. The trial court granted a temporary
injunction, but the landlord counterclaimed for possession of the premises
and damages.354 The tenant filed a motion to dismiss that counterclaim,
alleging its filing violated the injunction. After the ensuing motions and
hearings, the trial court affirmed its earlier injunction. The district court
interpreted this as the granting of a second injunction.355
The district court found that the first injunction had expired by its own
terms when the tenant failed to post the required bond.356 Moreover, it
concluded that the trial court had erred by granting the first injunction
because the tenant had an adequate remedy at law and would not have
suffered irreparable harm without the injunction.357 It could simply have
raised the need to determine the rent as a defense in the eviction action.
The district court also found that the second injunction had been
improperly granted because: the court had not stated the reasons for its
decision; the decision was not based upon affidavits, verified pleadings, or
sworn testimony; and the trial judge failed to require that a bond be posted
as was required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.358
It seems logical to allow a tenant a reasonable opportunity to have the
rent determined and make the payment before the tenant can be evicted for
nonpayment. If the county court could fashion that relief, then the remedy
at law would be adequate. There is apparently nothing in this case to
suggest that the county court could not have determined the rent and then
have given the tenant a reasonable time to pay before any eviction order
would take effect. But the case provides an example of why a rent
escalation clause should provide not only a formula for determining the rent,
but a procedure by which the rent can be determined if a planned formula
fails for some reason. Arbitration or the provision of alternative formulae
might be considered by the parties.
354. Id. at 944.
355. The first was issued on June 26, 1992 and the second was issued on December 18,
1992.
356. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 944.
357. Id.
358. Id.; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b).
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Meli Investment Corp. v. O.R.359 This was a per curiam opinion in
which Judges Barkdull, Nesbitt, and Goderich joined. Claiming the tenants
had heldover beyond the end of the lease, a landlord sued for eviction and
damages. The tenants disputed the holdover claim and counterclaimed
based upon wrongful eviction, harassment and discrimination against a
victim of AIDS which was, and is, prohibited by statute.3 60  After the
tenants prevailed, the court considered their motion for attorney's fees.
Both the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act36' and section
760.50(6)(a)(3) of the Florida Statutes provide for the recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees by the prevailing party.362 The trial court, after
hearing evidence, determined that tenants' counsel had expended sixty hours
on the case and were entitled to an hourly rate of $175. It then applied a
risk multiplier of two to reach a total award of $21,000.
The district court vacated this decision and remanded the case with
directions not to use a risk multiplier.3 63 The court noted that attorney's
fees cases are divided into "three basic categories: 1) public policy
enforcement cases; 2) tort and contract claims; and 3) family law, eminent
domain, and estate and trust matters. 3 6' A risk multiplier is applicable
in the public policy category only to offset a litigants facing substantial
difficulties in finding legal counsel. However, there was no evidence in the
record that such substantial difficulties existed in this case. The trial court
erred in applying a risk multiplier to counsel's efforts in that aspect of the
case.
365
The risk multiplier is applicable to tort and contract claims. The trial
court would have been correct in applying it to the portion of counsel's time
spent on the issue of whether the tenants had held over or whether either
party had breached the terms of the lease. On remand, the trial court would
have to divide counsel's time between these two categories and then
recalculate the total fee.
N.E.P. International, Inc. v. Falls.366 Judge Hersey wrote the opinion
with which Judges Gunther and Warner concurred. The tenant breached the
lease. The lease allowed rent acceleration in the event of the tenant's
359. 621 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
360. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(a)(3) (1991).
361. Id. ch. 83, pt. 11 (1991).
362. See id. § 83.48.
363. Meli Inv. Corp., 621 So. 2d at 677.
364. Id. (citing Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla. 1990)).
365. Id.
366. 629 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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default, so the trial court awarded judgment for the full amount of the rent,
including charges and real estate taxes for the full unexpired term. That was
error. In awarding damages, future damages must be reduced to their
present value.367
What complicated this case further was that the property was taken by
eminent domain after the breach but before the term was scheduled to end.
When a landlord has been allowed to recover future rent, taxes, or other
charges (even at the reduced present value), there must be a provision to
credit the tenant with any rent the landlord received or any overpayment for
the taxes or charges by the tenant. An accounting must eventually take
place. A trial court could retain jurisdiction to perform this accounting, or
simply provide that an independent action for an accounting may be brought
later.
In this case, the lease had been terminated by the taking. There would
be no future damages to reduce when the trial court reconsidered the case
on remand. At that time, the court could also perform the accounting and
then award damages along with prejudgment interest.
Orlando Regional Center, Inc. v. Ivey Properties, Inc.368 Judge
Peterson wrote the opinion with which Judges Dauksch and Cobb concurred.
This was a declaratory judgment action brought to determine the rent due
under the terms of a commercial lease. The rent included a percent of the
gross annual revenues, over a base amount, and a credit for capital
expenditures. The lease provided instructions for calculating these amounts
in narrative form, so calculating the rent was a complicated matter, at best.
The trial court's decision was reversed because "[n]either the result proposed
by the lessee nor the result proposed by the lessor and accepted by the trial
court represents an end product of a logical straightforward application of
the lease provisions in question."369
What is noteworthy about this case is the court's suggestion for the
future. "The lease does not provide an example of a computation, a
common method of aiding the interpretation of narrative instructions in
making mathematical calculations. An example could have avoided this
litigation. 3 70 The court demonstrated this by reducing the narrative to
mathematical formulae37' and then applying the formulae to the numbers
367. Id. at 1019.
368. 622 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
369. Id. at 1095.
370. Id. at 1094 n.1.
371. Id. at 1095.
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on which the parties had agreed.372 Those drafting or negotiating a
commercial lease would be well advised to follow the court's advice.
Seymour v. Adams. 73 Judge Griffin wrote the opinion. Chief Judge
Harris and Judge Dauksch concurred. The landlords obtained an eviction
judgment, including ajudgment for $8600 in unpaid rent. When the sheriff
executed the eviction writ, the tenant could not remove his personal
property, so it remained in the landlords' possession. The tenant demanded
access to the property, but the landlords refused, claiming a lien for the
unpaid rent. The tenant paid the rent due and again demanded his personal
property. The landlords again refused, this time based on a claim for the
unpaid storage fees. 74
The tenant sued for conversion, property damage, civil theft, and return
of the property. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary
judgment, but the district court reversed.375 The lease did not give the
landlord the right to retain possession of the tenant's personal property. The
landlords were not entitled to retain possession for unpaid storage fees based
on the "Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act 376
because they had not complied with its requirement of notice. 7 The
statutory landlord's lien for unpaid rent did not give them the right to retain
possession?" Furthermore, docketing the writ of execution did not give
them the right to retain possession. Consequently, summary judgment
should not have been granted on these claims because they were based upon
the landlords' wrongful refusal to return personal property to the tenant.
Thal v. S.G.D. Corp.379 This was a per curiam opinion by Judges
Jorgenson, Levy, and Gersten. One of the terms of the lease to Foljan, the
tenant, required that he pay the property taxes. After the taxes fell three
years in arrears, the landlord sued to terminate the lease and evict the
possessors. Landlord and tenant entered into a settlement agreement,
supported by consideration, under which Foljan surrendered the lease. The
problem was that Foljan had subleased the premises to S.G.D., and S.G.D.
372. Id.
373. 638 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
374. Id. at 1046.
375. Id.
376. FLA. STAT. §§ 715.10-.111 (1991).
377. Seymour, 638 So. 2d at 1048 (citing FLA. STAT. § 715.104 (1991)).
378. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (1991)).
379. 625 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review dismissed, 632 So. 2d 1027
(Fla. 1994).
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had refused to settle the case. The trial court refused to evict the subten-
ant.
380
The case turned on whether the settlement agreement amounted to a
termination of the Foljan's lease or whether it amounted to a surrender. If
the master lease is terminated, the rights of subleases are also terminated
because they are based upon the master lease. However, if the master lease
is voluntarily surrendered, then the landlord is the recipient of the tenant's
interest encumbered by the subleases. The district court concluded that the
master lease had beed canceled due to the tenant's default in not paying
property taxes. Thus, since the master lease fell, the sublease also fell. 8
The fact that the judgment was entered based upon an agreement of the
parties did not change that characterization.
The subtenant argued that it should not be evicted because it would
lose $400,000 in improvements. The district court had little sympathy for
this argument.382 It pointed ,out that this was a commercial sublease,
entered into at arms length between sophisticated business people. The
corporation knew that the sublease was no better than the lease of its mesne
landlord and, therefore, it had the opportunity to protect itself. Conse-
quently, there was nothing in the record to justify equitable relief.3 3
XVIII. LIENS AND MECHANIC'S LIENS
All-Brite Aluminum, Inc. v. Desrosiers.384 Acting Chief Judge Parker
wrote the majority opinion with which Justices Altenbernd and Blue
concurred. All-Brite filed this appeal challenging a lower court decision that
it was not the prevailing party under section 713.29 of the Florida
StatutesM and, therefore, was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees
and costs. 386 The dispute arose from a construction contract between the
Desrosiers, the owners of the real property, and a general contractor. The
general contractor filed for bankruptcy after being paid in full by the
Desrosiers but failed to pay All-Brite, a subcontractor. After All-Brite
timely filed its claim of lien and a complaint to foreclose the construction
lien, the Desrosiers advised All-Brite that some of the work was incomplete.
380. Id. at 852.
381. Id. at 853.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. 626 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
385. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1991).
386. All-Brite, 626 So. 2d at 1021.
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AII-Brite completed the work requested by the Desrosiers and amended its
claim of lien and complaint to reflect the additional money due for the
completed work. The Desrosiers then tendered payment to All-Brite for
only the moneys due under the original claim of lien and complaint. The
parties stipulated to a lien amount that was fifty-four cents less than the sum
claimed under the amended claim of lien and complaint. The trial court,
granting a lien for the stipulated amount, held there was no prevailing party.
Therefore, each party was responsible for its own costs and fees.3" 7
The appellate court found that All-Brite was the prevailing party.388
The court acknowledged that one must have recovered an amount exceeding
that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim in order to be a
prevailing party and entitled to the award of attorney's fees. Thus, the
Second District Court of Appeal reasoned that the amount offered in
settlement of the claim must have been made before the lienor filed his
complaint to foreclose the lien.389
The Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Soltesiz.390 Judge Campbell wrote
the majority opinion in this case with which Acting Chief Judge Danahy and
Judge Altenbemd concurred. The question before the court arose from a
consolidated appeal from two circuit court cases. The cases held that Dollar
Savings' foreign judgement, which it recorded pursuant to section 55.503
of the Florida Statutes, was subordinate and inferior to Barnett Bank's
mortgage, which was recorded within thirty days following Dollar's issuance
of recordation of the foreign judgment. In essence, the question was one of
whether a foreign judgment's lien priority arises as of the date the foreign
judgment is recorded pursuant to section 55.503 of the Florida Statutes or
the expiration of thirty days after the judgment creditor issues its notice of
recordation. 9'
In the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Soltesiz executed a second mortgage
in favor of Barnett three days after they received notice that Dollar had
recorded its Ohio judgment in Sarasota, Florida. The second mortgage had
the effect of diminishing the Soltesiz's equity in their Sarasota County,
Florida condominium. Dollar did not know of Barnett's second mortgage
and did not learn of it until the Soltesizs attempted to convey title to that
condominium. Thereafter, Barnett filed a mortgage foreclosure action on
both its first and second mortgages on the property, joining Dollar as a
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1022.
390. 636 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1994).
391. Id. at 63.
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defendant to determine lien priority. Both the court hearing the Soltesiz's
declaratory decree petition, and the court hearing the Barnett foreclosure
action found Dollar's foreign judgment subordinate to Barnett's second
mortgage.392
The appellate court perceived the question as one of whether section
55.503 of the Florida Statutes established a priority date for the lien, and
whether that date may be different than when the lien becomes enforce-
able.393 Ultimately, it concluded that the priority of a foreign judgment
lien is established when it is recorded pursuant to the requirements of
chapter 55 and section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes, even though the
enforcement of that lien may be delayed by further statutory provisions such
as sections 55.507 and 55.509.394
Emerald Designs, Inc. v. Citibank F.S.B.395 Judge Klein wrote the
majority opinion with which Judge Glickstein and Associate Judge Gross
concurred. The question before the appellate court was whether a subcon-
tractor has the right to claim an equitable lien against the undisbursed
construction loan funds in the hands of a lender, where although the
construction project is completed, the lender forecloses. 396
This question arose out of a foreclosure action in which Emerald
Designs, a subcontractor/defendant, filed a counterclaim to establish an
equitable lien on the undisbursed construction loan funds held by Citibank.
The gist of Emerald Designs' allegations was that Citibank would be
unjustly enriched if it were permitted to foreclose on the completed homes
and still retain the undisbursed loan funds. Contrary to the position taken
by the circuit court, the appellate court found for the subcontractor.397 It
stated that, since the subcontractor was not seeking priority over a recorded
mortgage, the subcontractor did not need to allege fraud or misrepresentation
to establish an equitable lien on the undisbursed construction loan funds.398
Therefore, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the subcontractor's
counterclaim for failure to state a .cause of action.399
392. Id. at 64.
393. Id. at 65.
394. Id. at 66.
395. 626 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
396. Id. at 1084.
397. Id. at 1085.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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Federal National Mortgage Ass' v. McKesson."' Associate Judge
Ramirez wrote the majority opinion with which Judges Gunther and Stone
concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court erred
in granting summaryjudgment in favor of a mobile home park homeowners'
association, declaring the associations' maintenance assessment lien superior
to the lien of the first mortgagee.40 1
To support its claim that its lien was superior, the association relied on
a declaration of covenants, which was the source of the lien rights for the
association. The association was the holder of a first mortgage that was
recorded after the declaration of covenants but before the association's claim
of lien. Citing "first in time is the first in right," the appellate court
reversed the summary judgment and found the first mortgage lien to be
superior. °2 Nevertheless, it certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
following question:
WHETHER A CLAIM OF LIEN RECORDED PURSUANT TO A
DECLARATION OF COVENANTS BY A HOMEOWNER'S
ASSOCIATION HAS PRIORITY OVER AN INTERVENING
RECORDED MORTGAGE WHERE THE DECLARATION AUTHO-
RIZES THE ASSOCIATION TO IMPOSE A LIEN FOR ASSESS-
MENTS BUT DOES NOT OTHERWISE INDICATE THAT THE
LIEN RELATES BACK OR TAKES PRIORITY OVER AN INTER-
VENING MORTGAGE.0 3
Gazebo Landscape Design, Inc. v. Bill Free Custom Homes, Inc. 4
This is an opinion written by Judge Polen with which Judges Anstead and
Stone concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court
erred in refusing to enforce Gazebo's mechanics lien against the homeown-
ers for landscaping work done by Gazebo through a general contractor,
when Gazebo had not provided notice to the owner within the forty-five day
period after furnishing services or materials, as required by section
713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes. 5
The gist of the question was when does a subcontractor begin to furnish
services for the purpose of timely providing the required notice to the
owner. In this case it was November 7, 1990, when one of Gazebo's
400. 639 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
401. Id. at 79.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 80.
404. 638 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
405. Id. at 88.
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representatives traveled with the property owners to meet with the tree
collector so that the property owners could select the trees. On December
5, 1990, Gazebo's employees dug the holes in preparation for the trees, and
December 7, when they planted the trees. On January 15, Gazebo sent
notice to the owner as required. However, the notice was returned
unclaimed. Therefore, on January 18, 1991, Gazebo posted a notice to the
owner on the gate of the homeowner's residence." 6
Noting that when a motion for an involuntary dismissal is made, the
trial court should consider all facts in evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff,0 7 the appellate court held that the facts at bar determined
that the subcontractor did not begin to furnish its services until the work was
actually performed at the job site.40 8 Therefore, the trial court should look
at all circumstances surrounding the particular job or transaction to
determine when the time begins to run.40 9 It also certified the following
question to the supreme court:
DOES A SUBCONTRACTOR BEGIN TO FURNISH SERVICES,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIMELY PROVIDING A NOTICE TO
OWNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 713.06(2)(a), FLORI-
DA STATUTES (1991), WHEN, WITHOUT ANY BINDING
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO, HE OR SHE BEGINS
TO SELECT MATERIALS AT SOME LOCATION OFF THE JOB
SITE, FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION ON THE JOB SITE?410
Lehmann Development Corp. v. Nirenblatt.41' This is a per curiam
opinion by Acting Chief Judge Threadgill, Judge Blue, and Associate Judge
Reese. The only question before the court was whether the time computa-
tions found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(a) control the time
period within which one must commence an action to enforce a construction
lien pursuant to section 713.22(1) of the Florida Statutes. Recognizing that
those computations apply to calculating the time within which to serve a
notice to owner under section 713.06(2)(a), the appellate court held that they
would to the period within which an action to enforce a construction lien
must be commenced under section 713.22().412
406. Id.
407. Id. at 89.
408. Id.
409. Gazebo, 638 So. 2d at 89.
410. Id.
411. 629 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
412. Id. at 1099.
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Prosperi v. Code, Inc. 4"3 This is an opinion written by Justice
Grimes with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald,
Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred. The Florida Supreme Court gave an
ambivalent answer to the question of whether an owner, who prevails on a
complaint filed to foreclose a mechanic's lien, would be entitled to
attorney's fees even though the same suit resulted in a judgment in favor of
the mechanic against the owner on a count for breach of contract for the
same transaction. 4 In so doing, the court reasoned that a claimant's
obtaining a net judgment is merely a significant factor, but not necessarily
a controlling factor, in determining the status of a prevailing party under
section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes. Thus, the trial judge is permitted
discretion to balance the equities in determining which party in fact
prevailed on the primary issues.1
Roger Homes Corp. v. Persant Construction Co. 416 Judge Jorgenson
wrote the majority opinion with which Judges Barkdull and Goderich
concurred. The question before the court was whether there was a sufficient
lien interest to support a lis pendens, where there was no duly recorded
instrument or mechanic's lien claim to support the lien interest." 7
The question arose out of a contract between Roger Homes and Persant
for the construction of roads and a water, sewage, and drainage system.
When Persant did not get paid for some of its work, it filed a mechanic's
lien. Roger Homes then signed an unsecured promissory note for the
balance due under the contract. Ultimately, Roger Homes failed to pay the
full amount of the note. Persant sued on the promissory note and attempted
to establish an equitable lien on Roger Homes' real estate on which Persant
had made the improvements. Consistent with this, it filed a lis pendens on
the property.418
Noting that an equitable lien might be sufficient to support a lis
pendens, the appellate court opined that, based on section 48.23 of the
Florida Statutes, such would have to be based on a duly recorded instrument
or on a mechanic's lien.4 9 The court also noted that an allegation that
Roger Homes was insolvent would support a claim by the contractor that
413. 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
414. Id. at 1363.
415. Id.
416. 637 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
417. Id. at 6.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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there would be no adequate remedy at law.42 Therefore, it would be
entitled to an equitable lien for which a lis pendens could be recorded.42" '
However, this is not shown in the record for Persant did not allege that
Roger Homes was insolvent. Therefore, the lis pendens was improper in
this case."'
C.L. Whiteside & Associates Construction Co. v. Landings Joint
Venture.423 Judge Farmer wrote the majority opinion with which Judge
Anstead and Senior Judge Walden concurred. The primary question before
the court was whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment
dismissing a subcontractor's mechanic's lien claim, where the subcontractor
had not filed formal notice to the owner.42 4
The Landings Joint Venture owned the property in question. RV
Landings, Inc. and Virginias at Delray, Ltd. were equal partners in that joint
venture. The joint venture, through its managing venture, RV Landings,
entered into a construction contract with Ragland Construction as the general
contractor. The same individual served as president of both RV Landings
and Ragland Construction. In addition, he was the principal shareholder of
RV Landings and the sole shareholder of Ragland, although he had no
ownership interest and performed no functions for Virginias.425 That same
individual signed the construction contract on behalf of the joint venture,
signed the notice of commencement for the joint venture, and was the
person to receive notice for the owner.426 Although an employee signed
the construction contract on behalf of Ragland, the president of Ragland
signed the contract with Whiteside for the structural shell work on the
project. Knowing of the common relationships between the owner and the
general contractor and having dealt with their president on prior occasions,
Whiteside sent no notice to the owner, believing it was unnecessary.427
It was not until a dispute arose that Whiteside sent its notice to the owner,
and subsequently, filed its claim of lien.428
420. Id. at 7.
421. Roger Homes, 637 So. 2d at 7.
422. Id.
423. 626 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
424. Id. at 1051.
425. Id. at 1052.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. C.L. Whiteside, 626 So. 2d at 1052.
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Referring to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Aetna Casualty
v. Buck,429 the court stressed that the purpose of serving a notice to the
owner was to inform the property owner that those not in privity of contract
with the owner were providing improvements to the property, and that they
would look to the property in the event they were not paid for their services
and materials. Thus the owner would be protected from possibly paying the
owner's contractor money which ought to go to an unpaid subcontrac-
tor.430 Hence, the notice to owner provisions of section 713.06 of the
Florida Statutes are excused when a subcontractor establishes privity with
the property owner. To establish privity, the owner must have knowledge
that a particular subcontractor is supplying services or materials and the
owner either expressly or impliedly assumed the contractual obligation to
pay those services. 41  Therefore, the subcontractor may also establish
privity where the owner and general contractor share a common identi-
ty.432 In this case, the appellate court held that there was a sufficient
question as to whether there was an established relationship between the
owner and general contractor so as to establish privity, thereby rendering the
notice to owner unnecessary.433
XIX. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana.434 Justice Shaw
wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred. The question was
whether a setback restriction was extinguished by Florida's Marketable
Record Title Act ("MRTA").435 The restriction was contained in a plat
filed in 1925. A developer purchased two lots in the area in 1990. When
building began, the homeowners' association sought a declaratory judgment
that the developer was violating the setback restriction. The developer's
root of title, by the time of this litigation, was a warranty deed dated
October 6, 1951. That deed referred to the plat by book and page in the
429. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992), appeal after remandsub nom. Pappalardo Constr. Co.
v. Buck, 630 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), and review denied, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.
1994).
430. C.L. Whiteside, 626 So. 2d at 1052.
431. Id. at 1053.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993).
435. FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1989). The relevant portions of this chapter have not
been changed to date.
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public records and also stated that the conveyance was subject to covenants
and restrictions of record.436 The trial court and the district concluded that
the restriction had been extinguished,437 but the Third District Court of
Appeal, with Chief Judge Schwartz dissenting only on the certification
issue,43 certified as being of great public importance, the following
question:
WHETHER THE FLORIDA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
HAS THE EFFECT OF EXTINGUISHING A PLAT RESTRICTION
WHICH WAS CREATED PRIOR TO THE ROOT OF TITLE WHERE
THE MUNIMENTS OF TITLE IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE DE-
SCRIBE THE PROPERTY BY ITS LEGAL DESCRIPTION WHICH
MAKES REFERENCE TO THE PLAT AND THE MUNIMENTS OF
TITLE STATE THAT THE CONVEYANCE IS GIVEN SUBJECT TO
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD.43
9
MRTA would, in effect, extinguish any restriction or title defect which
was in the record prior to the root of title.440  However, there is an
exception for "[e]states or interests, easements and use restrictions disclosed
by and defects inherent in the muniments of title on which said estate is
based beginning with the root of title. ... "44' But "a general reference
... shall not be sufficient to preserve them unless specific identification by
reference to book and page of record or by name of recorded plat be made
therein . . ,14' The district court found that the reference in this case
was too general to satisfy the statutory requirement, 443 but the supreme
court unanimously disagreed 4 4 because the deed referred to "Sunshine
Vistas," the name of the recorded plat that imposed the restriction.445
436. Sunshine, 623 So. 2d at 492.
437. Id. at 491.
438. Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass 'n v. Caruana, 597 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 618 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992), and decision quashed by 623
So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993). Judge Schwartz stated that "the issue involved here-while perhaps
interesting and certainly arguable-is of no concern, let alone of great importance, to anyone
but the litigants and an abstractor or two. The public as a whole could not care less." Id.
439. Sunshine, 623 So. 2d at 491.
440. See FLA. STAT. § 712.02 (1989).
441. Id. § 712.03(1).
442. Id.
443. Sunshine, 623 So. 2d at 492.
444. Id.
445. Id.
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The supreme court used very traditional logic. The court stated that as
a rule of statutory interpretation, every word or phrase included by the
legislature must have been intended to have meaning. Why else would it
have been included? Here, the statutory language "unless specific identifica-
tion by reference to... name of recorded plat be made therein.. ." would
be rendered meaningless by the district court's interpretation. Therefore, the
court concluded that the reference in this deed satisfies the plain meaning
of the statute.
That conclusion is bolstered by another line of logic. Reference in a
deed description to a plat generally has the effect of incorporating the plat's
terms into the deed. It is therefore consistent that such incorporation by
reference would be specific enough to satisfy the requirements of MRTA for
saving those terms, e.g., use restrictions, from being extinguished.
Water Control District of South Brevard v. Davidson.446 Judge Sharp
wrote the opinion with which Judges Goshom and Peterson concurred.
Landowners claimed that the Water Control District ("District") did not have
an easement for drainage and maintenance along the sides of a canal. The
district court concluded that the District had sustained its burden of proof
that it had acquired the easement by a 1922 decree which had not been lost
by reason of MRTA.447
The right of way on one side of the canal was being used. That placed
the easement within one of the statute's exceptions.44 The exception still
applied to the right of way on the other side of the canal even though it was
not in use. The two sides were part of one reservation. Use of a part of the
reserved easement was sufficient to place the entire easement within the
statutory exception to MRTA.449 This result was reinforced by invoking
the policy that "MRTA should be broadly construed to protect these rights
[for the use and benefit of the public] to the extent possible under the
law., ,450
XX. MOBILE HOME PARKS
Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. Partnership v. Stuart.45' Judge Barfield
wrote the opinion with which Judges Wilfe and Mickle concurred. Owners
446. 638 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
447. Id. at 526.
448. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 712.03(5) (1991)).
449. Id.
450. Id. (citing City of Jacksonville v. Horn, 496 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1986)).
451. 635 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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of mobile home parks sought a declaration that two provisions of the Florida
Mobile Home Act452 were invalid. They first challenged section 723.033
of the Florida Statutes.453 This section enables a court to grant relief to
park tenants upon a finding that the rent or a rental increase is unreasonable
as a matter of law. 54 It also provides that "a lot rental amount that is in
excess of market rent shall be considered unreasonable.""45  The owners
challenged this section as violating due process, but the trial court dis-
agreed.456
The court concluded that the statute satisfied the rational basis test
because it was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the protection
of a class of tenants who are in a uniquely vulnerable situation because they
only rent the lots on which the mobile homes are placed.457 The tenants
own the mobile homes which are "mobile" only in theory. Thus, it is not
economically feasible to move them because the moving expense may
approach, or even exceed, the home's value. Therefore, the tenants are at
a tremendous disadvantage in dealing with the landlord.
The trial court also rejected the claim that the legislature failed to
provide the Department of Business Regulation and the courts with
sufficient standards to guide the application of the statute.458 The statutory
test was whether the rent or rental increase was "reasonable." The
controlling principal is that a statute should be interpreted to avoid
constitutional defects whenever it is reasonably possible. By reading
subsections (3), (4), (5), and (6)439 in pari materia, the trial court was able
to interpret the statement in subsection (3) that "a lot rental amount that is
452. FLA. STAT. ch. 723 (1993). Section 723.001 of the Florida Statutes provides that
"[tihis chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 'Florida Mobile Home Act."'
453. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 62-63 (citing FLA. STAT. § 723.033 (Supp. 1990)). The
statute had been amended in 1990 by Act of Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 90-198, § 9, 1994 Fla. Laws
879, 883.
454. FLA. STAT. § 723.033(1).
455. Id. § 723.033(3).
456. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 63.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. Subsection (4) provided: "Market rent means that rent which would result
from market forces absent an unequal bargaining position between mobile home park owners
and mobile home owners." Subsection (5) provided: "In determining market rent, the court
may consider rents charged by comparable mobile home parks in its competitive area. To
be comparable, a mobile home park must offer similar facilities, services, amenities, and
management." Subsection (6) provided: "In determining whether a rent increase or resulting
lot rental amount is unreasonable, the court may consider economic or other factors.
FLA. STAT. § 723.033(4)-(6) (1993).
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in excess of the market rent shall be considered unreasonable" to be
"directory, rather than as mandatory and conclusive.""46 The court could
also have pointed out that relief was not mandatory, but within the court's
discretion. Whether a court of equity should exercise its discretion is a
standard which has a long evolution.
The district court agreed with the trial court's reasoning and conclusion.
It pointed out that this was not a traditional rent control statute.46 ' Rather,
it was intended "to balance the interests of mobile home owners and park
owners in the context of their unique economic relationship. ' 462 Section
723.061(2) of the Florida Statutes did not fare as well. This section
requires a mobile park owner who wishes to change his land use, either to
pay to have the tenants moved to another comparable park within fifty
miles, or to purchase the mobile homes and appurtenances from the tenants
at a statutorily determined value.463 The trial court held section 723.061-
(2) to be unconstitutional and the district court affirmed.4M Both conclud-
ed that its enforcement would cause an unconstitutional taking of the
landlord's private property without compensation. The district court pointed
out that "neither the 'buyout' option nor the 'relocation' option is even
economically feasible. Therefore, as a practical matter, the challenged
statute authorizes a permanent physical occupation of the park owner's
property and effectively extinguishes a fundamental attribute of ownership,
the right to physically occupy one's land. 4 65 Thus, it would amount to
a physical taking of the land. Moreover, it "singles out mobile home park
owners to bear an unfair burden, and therefore constitutes an unconstitution-
al regulatory taking of their property.
4 66
The district court also stated that section 723.061(2) did "not substan-
tially advance a legitimate state interest.16' That was unnecessary to its
logic, and seems to this author, to be inconsistent with what the court said
about the previous section. Protection of this group of tenants is a
legitimate state interest. Requiring the landlord to buy them out or relocate
them before changing the land use is a substantial increase in their level of
protection. The legislature cannot accomplish that by superimposing that
460. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 63.
461. Id. at 67.
462. Id.
463. FLA. STAT. § 723.061(2) (1993).
464. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 67.
465. Id. at 68.
466. Id.
467. Id.
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requirement upon existing landlord-tenant relationships. However, whether
that could be made a prospective requirement on future mobile home park
lot rentals is still an interesting question.
XXI. MORTGAGES
Batchin v. Barnett Bank of Southwest Florida.468 This is an opinion
written by Acting Chief Judge Ryder with which Judges Parker and Lazzara
concurred. The question before the court was whether, in a foreclosure
action, where the lender's attorney had factual information in his file
showing the defendant's address and phone number, service by publication
was proper.
4 69
In finding that service by publication was improper under the
circumstances, the appellate court noted that chapter forty-nine of the
Florida Statutes permits service by publication only where personal service
cannot be effected and that strict conpliance with these statutory procedures
for serving a defendant by publication is required.47 The one attempting
to serve by publication must affirm under oath that the plaintiff reasonably
employed the knowledge he had available and made an honest and
conscientious effort to acquire the information necessary to effect personal
service. The court stated that a diligent search would require an attorney to
review his own law firm's files. Thus, failing to look in one's own files
does not meet this test.47'
Carteret Savings Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp.472 This is an
opinion written by Justice Overton with which Chief Justice Barkett and
Justices McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred. This
opinion addressed a certified question from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal as follows:
WHERE A THIRD PARTY MORTGAGE LOAN IS USED NOT
ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASING PROPERTY, BUT IN
ADDITION, FOR CONSTRUCTING IMPROVEMENTS ON THE
PROPERTY, IS THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE MORTGAGE
ENTITLED TO PRIORITY AS A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
468. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D852 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1994), supercededon reh'g
in pl., 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1693 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1994).
469. Id. at D852.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. 632 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1994).
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OVER A GENERAL JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF THE MORTGAG-
OR?
473
Although the parties reached settlement prior to the rendering of the
supreme court's opinion, the court felt it was necessary to answer this
question of first impression in Florida since it was a question likely to arise
in the future, and other courts which had addressed the definition of a
purchase money mortgage under these circumstances have not ruled
consistently. 474 Therefore, the supreme court answered the certified
question in the negative. In so doing, it held that only the portion of a
mortgage loan that extended to purchase the property and existing improve-
ments would be entitled to priority as a purchase money mortgage.4 "
City of Jacksonville v. Nashid Properties, Inc.476 This is a majority
opinion written by Judge Kahn with which Chief Judge Zehmer and Judge
Benton concurred. The question before the court was whether the city was
exempt from having its mortgage lien extinguished by a tax deed issued
pursuant to section 197.552 of the Florida Statutes.47 7
The question arose when the city received an assignment of mortgage
from Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association of Jacksonville prior to
the issuance of the tax deed to Nashid. Nashid's position was that the
statutory reference to a "lien of record" did not apply to a mortgage held by
the city, but applied to governmental liens arising from taxes or other
governmental services. The appellate court rejected Nashid's position,
finding the statute clear on its face.47
CSB Realty, Inc. v. Eurobuilding Corp.479 This is a per curiam
opinion from an appeal heard before Judges Nesbitt, Baskin, and Gersten.
The question before the court was whether the trial court erred in allowing
the mortgagor to redeem the property foreclosed upon at the foreclosure sale
price, rather than for the amount of the judgment. The appellate court held
that to redeem the property, the mortgagor must pay the mortgage debt.480
473. Id. at 599.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. 636 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
477. Id. at 875.
478. Id. at 876.
479. 625 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
480. Id. at 1275-76.
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In so doing, it must pay the judgment amount when the foreclosure price is
less than the judgment obligation.48'
FDIC v. Diamond C Nurseries, Inc.482 This is an opinion written by
Judge Klein with which Judges Gunther and Polen concurred. The question
presented to the court was whether an unrecorded satisfaction of mortgage
which secured a loan from a lender, subsequently taken over by the FDIC,
barred foreclosure by the FDIC.4"3
Diamond C Nurseries allowed Republic Bank For Savings to place a
mortgage lien on Diamond C's fifty-three acre nursery in Palm Beach
County, Florida, as collateral for loans from the lender to business associates
of Diamond C's controlling shareholder. When the loan went into default,
Republic Bank filed its foreclosure action. Diamond C raised satisfaction
of the lien as an affirmative defense. It appears that the satisfaction was
signed by a Republic's president one month after the parties executed the
note and mortgage and one month before Republic recorded the mortgage.
However, the satisfaction was not recorded until almost two months after the
foreclosure action began. Subsequently, FDIC, as manager of the FSLIC
resolution fund, was substituted as plaintiff.484
Referring to both the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), the
court held that the unrecorded satisfaction did not preclude the foreclosure
action in question.485 The court recognized that D'Oench established a
federal policy to protect the FDIC from misrepresentations as to lenders'
assets and liabilities in their portfolios, where the FDIC insured those
lenders or made loans to those lenders.4"6 The court also acknowledged
that § 1823(e) was enacted so that bank examiners could rely on a bank's
records to evaluate the institution's assets and to judge adequately the loan
transactions in which those banks were involved. Therefore, no agreement
which would reduce the FDIC's interests in any asset acquired by it in
taking over a lending institution would be valid against the FDIC, unless thb
agreement: 1) was in writing, 2) was executed by both the depository
institution and anyone claiming an adverse interest under it, 3) was approved
by the institution's board of directors or its loan committee (reflected in the
481. Id.
482. 629 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla.
1994).
483. Id. at 158.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
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minutes of said board or committee), and 4) appeared continuously, after its
execution, as an official record of a depository institution." 7
In the present case, the lender's president responded to the examiner's
criticism of its dealings with the parties, by showing that the property in
question had been appraised at over one million dollars and that the lender
had obtained a mortgagee title insurance policy insuring the lien in question.
This occurred one year after the loan had taken place. Two years after the
loan had taken place another examination revealed that the property was still
the primary asset securing that loan.488 Therefore, the affirmative defense
was defeated both by the D'Oench doctrine and by § 1823(e)." 9
Frohman v. Bar-Or.49 This is a per curiam opinion by Judges
Anstead and Hersey, and Senior Judge Mager. The question was whether
the trial court erred in dismissing a petition for a deficiency decree solely
because it was filed more than one year after the final judgment of
foreclosure was entered.49" ' In affirming the dismissal, the court certified
the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
DOES FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.420(e) APPLY
TO A POST-TRIAL PROCEEDING, SUCH AS A MOTION FOR A
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT IN A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
SUIT
4 92
Mederos v. Selph (L. T.), Inc.493 This is an opinion written by Chief
Judge Harris with which Judges Dauksch and Cobb concurred. The
question presented to the court was whether a reformed mortgage, correcting
the identification of the mortgagor, had priority over the liens of judgment
creditors which were recorded between the recording of the original
mortgage and the recording of the reformed mortgage ultimately identifying
the correct mortgagor.494
Mederos loaned money to Selph's corporation. In return, Selph put up
two parcels of real estate as collateral. Originally, the mortgage reflected
the corporation as the owner and mortgagor for both parcels of property.
In reality Selph individually owned one parcel as a tenant in common with
487. Diamond C Nurseries, 629 So. 2d at 159.
488. Id. at 160.
489. Id. at 160-61.
490. 637 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
491. Id. at 370.
492. Id.
493. 625 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
494. Id. at 894.
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his former wife. After the mortgage was originally recorded, Selph's former
wife and another judgment creditor properly recorded their judgments
against Selph individually. Thereafter, Mederos filed an action to reform
the mortgage. The trial court permitted the reformation but ruled that the
reformed mortgage was subject to the judgment creditors as to Selph's 50%
interest in the property held with his ex-wife as tenants in common.495 In
affirming the trial court, the appellate court reasoned that a recorded
mortgage from one who is not the owner of record creates no mortgage lien
on the property and provides no notice to anyone subsequently acquiring an
interest in that property.496
Orlando Hyatt Associates, Ltd. v. FDIC.497 This is an opinion
written by Chief Judge Harris with which Judges Sharp and Thompson
concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court
committed error when it permitted a mortgagee to apply the income from
the subject premises encumbered by the mortgage lien, against any debt
owed to the mortgagee while the foreclosure proceedings were still in
progress.
498
Orlando Hyatt borrowed money from Dollar Dry Dock Savings Bank,
and secured the loan with a second mortgage on the Orlando Hyatt Hotel.
Subsequently, the parties executed a mortgage modification agreement, a
consolidated note replacing the original one, and an amended and restated
second mortgage and security agreement. In addition, Orlando Hyatt
secured the modified loan with a Present Assignment of Owner's Remittance
Amount, assigning absolutely all of its right, title, and interest in any
remittance due it under the management agreement with the Hyatt Corpora-
tion, the corporation which managed the hotel. 99
Once the loan went into default, the FDIC, as successor mortgagee,
filed its foreclosure action. In response to the FDIC's motion seeking the
appointment of a receiver and motion to compel the deposit of rents, the
trial court ordered that the FDIC was to receive the hotel's revenues directly
and after paying the first mortgagee, apply them to its second mortgage
which was involved in the foreclosure action. 00
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. 629 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
498. Id. at 975.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 976.
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The court reasoned that since section 697.07 of the Florida Statutes
applies only to rents, it did not apply to hotel revenues."' Therefore, the
court and the parties would have to look to other statutory and case law.
Citing numerous Florida cases,"' the court ruled that although a mortgag-
or may pledge rents and profits from realty, such a pledge does not become
binding until the trial court either appoints a receiver, or the mortgagee goes
into actual possession. Therefore, even if the assignment is absolute and
unconditional, it does not give the mortgagee a right to the funds before the
trial court has made a determination on the merits of the foreclosure
action." 3
Ormond Beach Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Citation Mortgage,
Ltd."4 This is an opinion written by Judge Griffin with which Chief
Judge Harris and Judge Thompson concurred. The question presented to the
court was whether section 697.07 of the Florida Statutes permitted the
assignment of rents in the possession of the mortgagor at the time of the
mortgagee's written demand as well as to those collected after the de-
mand. 5
Prior to the enactment of section 697.07, Florida's lien theory provided
for no transfer of ownership in rents until there was a change of the
ownership in the underlying property." 6 Although the 1991 version of
section 697.07 apparently intended to permit the mortgagee to reach even
those rents in the mortgagor's possession at the time of demand, the courts
were not clear on the subject. However, this court found that the 1993
revision to that statute clarified the intent and permitted the mortgagee to
sequester both categories of rent.50 7
Padron v. Plantada.5 8 This is an opinion written by Judge Levy.
The question before the court was whether a mortgage broker performed as
required under the contract with the prospective mortgagors, thereby
entitling him to a broker's fee.509
The prospective borrowers and the broker entered into an agreement for
the payment of a broker's commission, if the broker were to procure a loan
501. Id.
502. Orlando Hyatt, 629 So. 2d at 976-77.
503. Id. at 977.
504. 634 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
505. Id. at 1092.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. 632 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 639 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1994).
509. Id. at 113.
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commitment at a fixed interest rate for thirty years. Instead, the broker
procured a commitment in the required principal amount with a floating rate
for thirty years. The borrowers immediately rejected the commitment.
Ultimately the prospective borrowers acquired a mortgage through another
broker and through another lender. When the broker sued for his commis-
sion, the trial court entered judgment in the broker's favor. The appellate
court, however, held that the offered commitment with a floating interest
rate did not comply with the contract requirement of a 10% fixed interest
rate, since the floating interest rate was subject to increase anytime before
closing. Therefore, the broker was not entitled to his commission 10
Parker v. Heilpern.51 ' This is a per curiam opinion from an appeal
heard by Judges Anstead, Glickstein, and Farmer. The question was
whether the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, who had not
yet been successfully served with process, waived her objection to jurisdic-
tion when she objected to a co-defendant's motion for sharing in the
proceeds of any sale. The appellate court found that such a waiver had not
occurred since the defendant sought no affirmative relief.5"2
Pici v. First Union National Bank of Florida.513 This is an opinion
written by Judge Frank with which Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Judge
Blue concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court
erred in issuing a prejudgment writ of replevin." 4
Pici defaulted on his note with First Union by failing to make the
September and October 1992 payments. When First Union notified Pici of
the default and demanded that the account be brought current on October
26, 1992, Pici paid all sums, including late charges on November 1992 to
a teller at one of First Union's branches. After its default notice of October
26, and before Pici's payment on November 9, First Union, without notice
to Pici, decided to accelerate the balance of the note. First Union filed its
complaint on November 13, 1992 and sought an ex parte prejudgment writ
of replevin, posted its bond, and seized the collateral. On November 16,
1992, Pici made the November payment to First Union. Subsequently, he
moved the trial court for a dismissal of the writ of replevin. From the
denial of that motion, Pici took this appeal." 5
510. Id. at 113-14.
511. 637 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
512. Id. at 296.
513. 621 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 629 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1993).
514. Id. at 733.
515. Id.
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In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that Florida law
identifies equitable grounds for denying foreclosure on an accelerated basis.
These grounds include circumstances where the mortgagor has tendered
payment after default but before the notice of the mortgagee's accelerating
the obligation has been given to the mortgagor." 6 Noting that the key
term is "tender," the court emphasized that it is not necessary for the
mortgagee to accept the tender for this equitable principle to apply. Actual
acceleration cannot be accomplished without notice to the debtor. Once the
debtor tenders all sums due, his account is current and a prejudgment writ
of replevin would not be sustained.51
Republic National Bank v. Manzini & Associates, P.A.51 This is a
per curiam opinion from an appeal held before Chief Judge Schwartz and
Judges Nesbitt and Cope. The question presented to the court was whether
the holder of a note and mortgage was estopped from asserting its mortgage
on the ground that the FDIC gave mistaken information as to the mortgage's
satisfaction." 9
Manzini and Associates took a quitclaim deed to a condominium in
place of receiving payment for legal services. At the time it knew that there
was a mortgage on the subject property. Subsequently, the FDIC advised
the firm that the mortgage was satisfied. Therefore, although this informa-
tion was incorrect, the law firm took the position that the lender should be
estopped from asserting its mortgage. 20
In reviewing this case, the district court noted that a satisfaction or
release of the mortgage given as the result of a mistake will not benefit any
person or entity who acquires an interest in the property so long as they did
not rely on or advance any consideration on the faith of such representa-
tion.52' In this case, the law firm neither relied on nor advanced any
consideration on the basis of the incorrect information. Therefore, Republic
was not estopped from asserting its mortgage.
Sand Point Village, Ltd. v. Highlands Insurance Co."' This is an
opinion arising out of an appeal heard before Judges Baskin, Jorgenson, and
516. Id. at 734.
517. Id. at 733-34.
518. 621 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1994).
519. Id. at 710.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. 634 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 1994).
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Levy. The question was whether the trial court erred in enforcing a
settlement stipulation between an insurance company and property owner.
The settlement provided for insurance payments to the first mortgagee, but
not to the second mortgagee. The second mortgagee also challenged the
dismissal of the action with a discharge of the insurance company's further
liability relating to the fire in question.524
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court.525 In so
doing, it reasoned that the second mortgagee had not been given adequate
time to explore the ramifications of the settlement agreement. In addition,
the court noted that the second mortgagee was not a party to the settlement.
Therefore, since its rights are materially affected by the decision as to
whether or not it receives proceeds from the insurance company and as to
the amount of insurance paid to the first mortgagee, resulting in a reduction
in the principal owed to the first mortgagee, the trial court erred in discharg-
ing the insurance company prior to the second mortgagee's being afforded
the opportunity to conduct the necessary discovery to ascertain the
ramifications of the settlement agreement.
5 26
Sciandra v. First Union National Bank.27  This is a per curiam
opinion from an appeal heard before Acting Chief Judge Hall and Judges
Blue and Altenbernd. Judge Altenbernd concurred specially with an
opinion. The question was whether the trial court erred in awarding interest
on the amount found due as pre-judgment interest. The Second District
Court of Appeal found that the trial court did err, and therefore, reversed
that portion of the judgment.52
Judge Altenbernd's concurring opinion raises the doctrine of merger,
i.e., that the cause of action and the damages recoverable as a result of it,
merge into the judgment entered on that cause of action.529 Judge
Altenbernd noted that the judgment's aggregate amount includes many
elements of damages, including, but not limited to the interest in question.
Once the judgment is entered it does not bear interest as a cause of action
or as an element of damage but, rather, as a single judgment. Therefore,
there would not be a compounding of interest. The concurring opinion
524. Id. at 312.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. 638 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
528. Id. at 1009.
529. Id. at 1010.
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suggests that it would be more appropriate to regard pre-judgment interest
as an early award of judgment interest to solve the problem.53
Also, effective October 1, 1994 is Senate Bill No. 204 of chapter 94-
288 of the Florida Statutes.3' As of that date it will be unlawful for any
person, with the intent to defraud the owner of real property, to engage in'
such activities as purchasing defined real estate subject to loans that either
are in default at the time of purchase, or which go into default within one
year after the purchase, where such loan is secured by a mortgage or deed
of trust, and there is a failure to make the mortgage payments and the
purchaser uses the income from such properties for his own use. These acts
will constitute a third degree felony and will be punished as provided in
sections 775.082, 775.083, and 755.084 of the Florida Statutes.532
XXII. OPTIONS
Drost v. Hill.33 This is an opinion written by Judge Cope with
which Judges Nesbitt and Levy concurred. A six month lease included a
term option to extend the lease for a five year term. If the five year option
would have been exercised, then the tenants would also have had the option
to purchase the property. But neither a purchase price nor a method of
determining a purchase price were specified. The price was to be estab-
lished at some time in the future.
The tenant notified the landlord that it was exercising the five-year
extension option, but the parties were unable to agree to the terms. The
tenant sued for specific performance, which the trial court awarded, ordering
the landlord to provide that the option purchase price would be the
property's fair market value. The district court reversed. It held that the
lack of terms and the ongoing negotiations established there had been no
meeting of the minds on a material term, i.e., the price. Consequently, the
option was illusory and an illusory contract cannot be enforced.534
XXIII. TAXES
Florida Hotel and Motel Ass 'n v. State.35 This is an opinion written
by Judge Webster with which Judges Booth and Allen concurred. The
530. Id.
531. Act of Oct. 1, 1994, ch. 94-288, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 1854.
532. See id.
533. 639 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1994).
534. Id. at 106.
535. 635 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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question before the court was whether the tangible personal property that
hotels and motels purchase and use in guest rooms, incident to their
business, is purchased for "resale," and thereby prohibited from a tax
exemption on that ground. The court also considered whether imposing a
sales tax or use tax on the purchase of that property and upon the rental of
guest rooms constituted duplicate taxation.536
The subject questions arose from a petition for a declaratory statement
filed with the Department of Revenue by Florida Hotel and Motel Associa-
tion, Inc. and Naples Golf and Beach Club, Inc. When the department
rejected their claims, they took the subject appeal. Recognizing that hotels
and motels are in the business of furnishing services and entertainment, the
appellate court noted that hotels and motels are simply not in the business
of buying and reselling or leasing guest room furniture, furnishings, and
consumables.537 Therefore, they were not entitled to the exemption
provided by section 212.05(1)(a)l.a of the Florida Statutes."'
Fuchs v. Wilkinson.539 This is an opinion written by Justice Overton
with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices McDonald, Shaw, Grimes,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. The question presented to the court was
whether the trial court erred in holding that the limitations on the assessed
value of homestead property contained in an amendment to article VII,
section 4, of the Florida Constitution, were to become effective January 1,
1994, rather than January 1, 1995, thereby making 1993 the base year for
the limitations' application. The question came before the Florida Supreme
Court as one certified from the Second District Court of Appeal.540
The Florida Supreme Court held that the amendment's clear language
indicated January 1, 1994 as the first "just value" assessment date.5 4 ,
Because of this, the operative date for the limitations contained in the
amendment to establish the "tax value" of homestead property would be
January 1, 1995.542
The difficulty arising in this case came from the amendment's lack of
an effective date provision. Where an amendment fails to establish an
effective date, the Florida Constitution provides that the amendment shall
become effective on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January
536. Id. at 1045.
537. Id. at 1047.
538. Id.
539. 630 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1994).
540. Id. at 1044.
541. Id. at 1045-46.
542. Id. at 1046.
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following the date of the election in which the voters adopted the amend-
ment.143 The amendment in this case was adopted November 3, 1992, and
thus became effective on January 5, 1993. Therefore, the year following the
effective date of the amendment is 1994 and, pursuant to the express
language of the statute, January 1, 1994 became the date for assessing the
property at just value. As a result, January 1, 1995 became the first tax year
date where the limitations in the amendment would be used to calculate the
"tax value" of the homestead property.5"
Margate Investment Corp. v. Lupowitz.5 45 This opinion was written
by Judge Polen with which Judges Glickstein and Warner concurred. The
question before the court was whether the grantor, under a general warranty
deed executed in 1981, breached its covenant against encumbrances by
failing to pay those real property taxes levied for 1980, but were not
assessed until 1985.546 Relying on section 197.056(1) of the Florida
Statutes, the court opined that real estate taxes are liens as of the year the
taxes are levied. Therefore, if they in fact encumber the property when the
grantor makes the warranty, the grantor has not breached the warranty
against encumbrances. 47
Santana v. Metropolitan Dade County.48 This is an opinion written
by Judge Cope. The sole question before the court was whether one who
was looking to redeem a tax deed had to pay not only what was due on the
tax deed but, in addition, any other delinquent taxes that remained unpaid
even if they had not yet been reduced to tax deeds.549 The Third District
Court of Appeal answered the question in the affirmative.55 °
Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc.551 This is a per
curiam opinion with which Acting Chief Judge Campbell and Judge
Threadgill concurred, and with which Judge Schoonover concurred in result
only. The question was whether churches, which are exempt from taxation,
would also be exempt from the payment of special assessments. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court in finding that fire and rescue
543. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c).
544. Fuchs, 630 So. 2d at 1046.
545. 638 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
546. Id. at 143.
547. Id.
548. 641 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
549. Id. at 118.
550. Id. at 119.
551. 641 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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services were valid special assessments for which churches would be liable,
but that stormwater management services would not be. 52
Section 3 Property Corp. v. Robbins.53 This is an opinion written
by Justice McDonald with which Justices Overton, Shaw, Grimes, Kogan,
and Harding concurred, and with which Chief Justice Barkett concurred in
the result only. The question before the court was presented as a certified
question:
Is there a right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 22 of the Florida
Constitution (1968), in a tax action to challenge a Property Appraiser's
grant of an agricultural exemption?.54
The Florida Supreme Court answered the question in the negative.5
The court reasoned that controversies surrounding the taxation of real
property were typically found in equity, not in law. 56 The majority
looked to section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes to ascertain whether the
legislature had provided for an alternative approach. Finding that it had not,
the court determined that, although it would require some factual determina-
tion to answer the question, the analysis was more like determining an
interest in realty, thereby invoking the court's equitable jurisdiction. 57
SEC v. Elliott."8 This is an opinion written by Justice Shaw with
which Justices Overton, Kogan, and Harding concurred. However, Chief
Justice Barkett dissented with an opinion with which Justices McDonald and
Grimes concurred. The question presented to the court was a question
certified by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal as follows:
Does a Florida tax certificate represent an interest in land for purposes
of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, so that Article 9 does not
govern the creation of a security interest therein by virtue of §
679.104(10) [, Florida Statutes (1991)?] 559
552. Id. at 901.
553. 632 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1993).
554. Id. at 596.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. 620 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit answered the certified question
in the affirmitive. See 998 F.2d 922 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
559. Id. at 159.
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The question arose from Elliott's use of Florida tax certificates as
collateral for a loan. When his assets ended up in equitable receivership, the
creditors attempted to collect the taxes paid on the subject properties.
However, the district court's order froze those assets. The district court
concluded that those certificates were intangible personal property when
used as collateral, i.e., general intangibles, and that the only way to protect
a security interest in those assets would have been by filing a UCC
financing statement with the secretary of state. Because the creditors had
failed to do so, they were unsecured. 60 The Florida Supreme Court
answered the certified question in the affirmative, thereby finding that the
UCC filing was unnecessary.-
6
The majority opinion based its conclusion on the analysis of three
statutes. The first was section 197.102.562 This statute defines a tax
certificate as a legal document representing unpaid delinquent real property
taxes which becomes a first lien on the subject property. The second statute
was section 679.104(1 0).563 This statute provided that chapter 679 would
not apply except to provide for fixtures, to the creation of or the transfer of
interests in or liens upon real estate, including leases or rents. The third
statute was section 679.102(2).64 This statute provided that chapter 679
would not apply to statutory liens. The court reasoned that because a tax
certificate was a lien on real property and a statutory lien, the language of
sections 197.02(3), 679.104(10), and 679.102(2) clearly excludes tax
certificates from chapter 679. The majority felt that the primary question
was whether the tax certificate itself was exempt from chapter 679.565
On the other hand, Chief Justice Barkett and Justices McDonald and
Grimes differed on that question. Chief Justice Barkett's dissenting opinion
pointedly criticized the majority opinion. The dissent agreed that one's
holding of a tax certificate creates an interest that is not subject to chapter
679. However, it pointed out that the question here was whether the
transfer of an interest in those certificates as collateral for a loan would be
subject to chapter 679.566 To support their position, the dissenters pointed
to the UCC's official comment to section 679.102(3). The gist of the
official comment is that the UCC does not apply to the creation of a
560. Id. at 159-60.
561. Id. at 159.
562. FLA. STAT. § 197.102(3) (1991).
563. Id. § 679.104(10).
564. Id. § 679.102(2).
565. Elliott, 620 So. 2d at 160.
566. Id. at 161.
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mortgage. In addition, it will not apply to the sale of the note by the
mortgagee. On the other hand, if the mortgagee pledges the note to secure
the mortgagee's separate indebtedness to a third person, the UCC would
apply to that security interest. The dissenters felt that the circumstances
involved in the instant case were analogous to the last scenario in the
official comment.
67
XXIV. TITLE INSURANCE
Sommers v. Smith and Berman, P.A.168 This is an opinion written by
Judge Klein with which Chief Judge Dell and Senior Judge Owen con-
curred. The question before the court was whether a title insurance
company was liable to the purchasers of real estate for the purported
negligence of the attorney who handled the closing and issued the title
insurance policy through the underwriter.1
69
The purchasers and the sellers of the real estate in question entered into
a contract. However, the contract refers to the property only by street
address. Because of representations made by the seller and the real estate
broker, the purchasers thought that the property was larger than it actually
was. The lawyer who represented the buyers at closing and who issued the
title insurance policy through the underwriter was aware of a survey that
obtained a legal description fitting the buyers' expectations but which was
different from the legal description in the deed and the title insurance policy.
The appellate court held that, since one can be an agent of the insurance
company for one purpose and an agent of the insured for other purposes,
there would be no liability on the part of the underwriter where the title
insurer did not conduct the closing as a "closing agent."57
XXV. VENDOR AND PURCHASER UNDER CONTRACT OF
PURCHASE AND SALE
Bird Lakes Development Corp. v. Meruelo.7' This is an opinion
written by Judge Ferguson. The buyer bought thirty-five acres of undevel-
oped land after the seller orally represented that there were sewer lines. On
discovering that not to true, the buyer sued for specific performance and
567. Id.
568. 637 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
569. Id. at 61.
570. Id. at 61-62.
571. 626 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 637 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1994).
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damages. The judgment for the buyer was affirmed.572 The trial court did
not err when it concluded that the parties entered into an oral contract to
construct the sewers. The oral contract did not involve the transfer of any
interest in land, e.g., an easement, so it was not required to be in writing by
the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the contract to construct the sewers was
collateral to, but independent of, the contract of sale. Consequently, the
merger clause in the contract of sale would not be applicable to the sewer
construction contract. 3
Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Ameripalms 6B GP, Inc.574 This was a
per curiam opinion from Judges Hubbart, Gersten, and Goderich. This case
involved contract interpretation and the parol evidence rule. The buyer and
seller began negotiating the purchase and sale of two properties, parcels 6
and 6B. The transaction was eventually structured as two separate contracts
of sale. The terms of the first contract, which covered parcel 6B, required
the buyer to give a $25,000 deposit, and to pay $2 million in cash, and to
deliver a $675,000 promissory note at closing.575
The draft note provided that the note would be payable when the buyer
and seller "close, or are obligated to close, on the sale of Unit 6 ....
However, the note they executed provided that it would only be payable
when the city accepted their application for processing for development
approval. When the city accepted the application for processing, the buyer
paid the note. The seller used the money to satisfy some of its mortgage
debt owed to Citicorp Real Estate.
But something went awry. There was never a closing on parcel 6.
Consequently, the buyer sued for the return of its $675,000 from the seller
and Citicorp Real Estate on the theories of conversion, money had and
received, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the buyer and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.577
The trial court apparently relied upon the contract to reach its
conclusion that the money should be returned. It stated that "[t]he law is
well established that two or more documents executed by the same parties,
at or near the same time, and concerning the same transaction or subject
matter are generally construed together as a single contract."57 The note
572. Id. at 236.
573. Id. at 238.
574. 633 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
575. Id. at 48.
576. Id.
577. Id. at 48-49.
578. Id. at 49.
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and the contract were not executed at the same time, but they were executed
by the same parties and the contemporaneous requirement was satisfied by
their having grown out of the same transaction. The contract provided the
only evidence of the parties' intent to treat the two sales as one transaction,
so summary judgment was appropriate. 79
Cruise v. Graham.8 This is an opinion written by Judge Hersey
with which Judges Gunther and Stone concurred. As part of a real estate
transaction, the seller agreed to take back a second mortgage for part of the
purchase price. The agreement provided that the buyer would obtain the
rest of the purchase price from another lender who would have a first
mortgage, but the first mortgage debt could not exceed $35,950. When it
was foreclosed, the seller and his attorney discovered that the first mortgage
debt was $45,000.8I
The seller had $35,950 in reserve to redeem the property from the first
mortgage in the event of default. However, the seller apparently was not
allowed to redeem for that amount and the foreclosure sale extinguished his
security interest. As a result, the seller brought this suit for fraudulent
misrepresentation against the mortgage broker and its employee, Ray Cruise.
The seller prevailed in the trial court and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.'82
The first defense raised was that the defendants' representations had
been made to plaintiff's attorney and not directly to the plaintiff. The
appellate court had little difficulty in disposing with this argument.
Generally, an attorney is an agent of his or her client. The acts of an agent
are the acts of the principal. Therefore, misrepresentations made to the
agent are, in effect, misrepresentations made to the client.
Another defense raised was that the seller, or seller's attorney, was
negligent or at fault for not properly examining the documents prior to or
at the closing. But this was an action based on fraud. Fraud is an
intentional tort. Consequently, the seller's comparative fault or negligence
was not a defense.
Finally, the defendants argued that punitive damages should not have
been awarded since there was no evidence introduced that the defendants'
conduct was outrageous or reprehensible. The district court rejected the
argument." 3 It is now an accepted rule in Florida that punitive damages
579. Citicorp Real Estate, 633 So. 2d at 49.
580, 622 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
581. Id. at 38.
582. Id. at 39-40.
583. Id. at 41.
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can be awarded based upon a claim of fraud if there is sufficient evidence
to support an award of compensatory damages.584 In this case there was
sufficient evidence that: 1) the representations had been made, even if that
had occurred in a telephone conversation two months before the closing, 2)
the defendants had justifiably relied upon them, and 3) the plaintiff had been
harmed. 8 5
Edelberg v. Monogram Building & Design.86 This is an opinion
written by Judge Hersey with which Judge Pariente and Senior Judge
Walden, James H., concurred. Section 501.1375 of the Florida Statutes
concerns contracts to purchase one or two-family homes from building
contractors or developers. 8 7 The statute requires deposits of up to 10%
of the purchase price be put in interest bearing escrow accounts. According
to the statute, that money can be released without the signature of both the
buyer and seller in only five situations: 1) the posting of a surety bond; 2)
the existence of a master security bond; 3) the buyer properly terminates the
contract; 4) the buyer defaults; or 5) at closing, if the funds have not been
previously disbursed. 588 The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted
the language of the fourth situation. 89
The escrow money had been in a law firm's trust account. The buyers
allegedly tried to withdraw from the transaction due to their financial
reverses. The developer considered this to be a default which would entitle
it to withdraw the money. As required by the statute, it gave the buyer
notice of its intention to make the withdrawal, after a seventy-two hour wait,
based upon the default. The buyers claimed that they were not in default
because the contract was conditioned on their ability to get financing. They
sought, but were refused, a temporary injunction. So the developer
completed the statutory procedure and withdrew the money.590
The trial court refused to issue the injunction because it involved only
a dispute over money. The district court rejected the trial court's logic.
First, it pointed out that the statute allowed disbursal in the event of a
buyer's default, not in the event the developer certifies that the buyer is in
584. Id.
585. Cruise, 622 So. 2d at 39.
586. 630 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
587. FLA. STAT. § 501.1375 (1989).
588. Id.
589. Edelberg, 630 So. 2d at 1228-29.
590. Id. at 1228.
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default. There had been no determination here that the buyer was in
default.59
Furthermore, the statute was intended to be a consumer protection
device. Both the spirit of the statute and procedural due process592 require
that the buyer receive a full and fair hearing on a disputed issue at a
meaningful time. Consequently, the trial court should not have denied the
injunction. There would have to be a judicial determination whether buyer
had defaulted before the funds could be disbursed.
The district court, however, refused to speculate on the whether the act
provided this escrow agent immunity. The act does provide immunity for
the escrow agent who complies with the statutory procedure following
default.593 But in this case, a trial court would first have to determine if
there had been a default.
594
Green Acres, Inc. v. First Union National Bank.595 This is an
opinion written by Judge Pariente with which Judges Polen and Farmer
concurred. The buyers sued for damages, alleging that the sellers knew, but
intentionally failed to disclose, that the land contained an Indian burial site
which would interfere with their development plans. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court
reversed, holding that the buyers should have been given the opportunity to
amend the complaint to include the claim that the sellers had breached a
contractual duty to disclose those facts.596 The court reasoned that this
claim could be based upon certain language in the documents.5 97
The court declined to expand Johnson v. Davis,598 which had abol-
ished caveat emptor in residential real estate sales, to include commercial
real estate transactions.5 99 The First District Court of Appeal had taken
that step,600 but the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal had
expressly refused to do so. 60 ' This court, however, left open the possibili-
591. Id. at 1229.
592. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
593. FLA. STAT. § 501.1375(7)(d) (1989).
594. Edelberg, 630 So. 2d at 1229.
595. 637 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
596. Id. at 364-65.
597. Id. at 364.
598. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
599. Green Acres, 637 So. 2d at 365.
600. See Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review
dismissed sub nom. Service Merchandise Co. v. Lane Co., 620 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1993).
601. See Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993); Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs. Inc., 578
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ty that it might conclude, at a later time, that commercial real estate sellers
might have a duty to disclose material facts under particular circumstan-
ces.6"2 It is obviously time for the supreme court, or the legislature, to
clarify the obligations of the commercial real estate seller.
Mall v. Pawelski. °3 This was a per curiam opinion in which Judges
Gunther and Pariente, and Senior Judge Downey concurred. The buyer had
purchased a house with a seventeen-year-old roof which began to leak
shortly after the home was purchased. The buyers eventually replaced the
roof, sued for the replacement cost, and won in the circuit court. While
agreeing that the seller was liable, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed on the issue of damages.6"4
The buyers had bargained for a seventeen-year-old roof. To allow
them to recover for the full cost of a new roof with a far greater life
expectancy would give them far more than they had bargained for, unjustly
enriching them at the seller's expense. The buyers were entitled only to
recover for the roof's replacement, "prorated to account for the increased
life expectancy of the new roof."6"5
Walton v. Runck.6"6 This is an opinion written by Judge Hall with
which Chief Judge Frank and Judge Parker concurred. This case involved
a contract to exchange a parcel of North Dakota land for some Florida land.
A dispute arose, which resulted in this suit. The trial court concluded that
the parties had abandoned the contract. Then, exercising its broad equity
powers, the trial court divided the equity in the Florida land and ordered it
sold even though neither party had asked for that relief. The district court
concluded that, under established law, the trial court did not have jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief without a request for it from one of the parties.607
XXVI. WATER AND WATER COURSES
Chiles v. Floridian Sports Club, Inc.6"' This is an opinion written by
Chief Judge Harris with which Judges Sharp and Thompson concurred. The
question before the court was whether the trial court erred in holding, as a
So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 591 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991).
602. Green Acres, 637 So. 2d at 365.
603. 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
604. Id. at 292.
605. Id.
606. 630 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
607. Id. at 222.
608. 633 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1994]
Nova Law Review
matter of law, that the waters of the St. Johns River in Welaka (Putnam
County) were non-tidal waters." 9
Through a series of mesne conveyances, Floridian acquired title to real
property abutting the St. Johns River, at which time a lease was in effect
that required the abutting landowner to make annual rental payments to the
state for the submerged land underlying the landowner's boathouse and
docks. However, when the state demanded the required lease payments,
Floridian filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was
exempted from having to make such rental payments. Floridian's argument
in favor of such exemption was that, since prior cases have found that the
St. Johns River waters were non-tidal in Welaka, the affidavits in opposition
to Floridian's motion for summary judgment, purportedly factually
establishing that the waters in that area were tidally influenced, were
ineffective for the purposes of defeating a motion for summary judg-
ment.6"0 To gain the protection of the Butler Act and to show that the
state had no title to the submerged lands, Floridian needed to show that the
waters were either non-tidal or that, if they were tidal waters, the improve-
ments were completed prior to May 29, 1951 when the Butler Act was
repealed as to submerged land in tidal waters.61'
The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings since the supreme court took the position that,
notwithstanding prior case law, the affidavits presented by the state in this
case created genuine issues of material fact.6" 2
Concerned Citizens of Putnam County for Responsible Government,
Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Management District.6 1 3 This is an opinion
written by Judge Peterson with which Judges Goshorn and Thompson
concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court erred
in dismissing Citizens' complaint for injunctive relief with prejudice.
Citizens' goals were that the St. Johns River Management District be
required to establish minimum water flow levels; to refrain, until that time,
from issuing consumptive water permits as to those areas of the district
having critical water shortage problems; and, to cut back the water
consumption volume in those critical areas until the region recovered
sufficiently." 4
609. Id. at 50.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 51.
612. Id. at 52-53.
613. 622 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
614. Id. at 521.
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Citizens' complaint sought to require the district to comply with the
Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes,
particularly section 373.042 which requires each district to establish
minimum flows and levels.6"' The district had taken the position that,
although the statute states that each district "shall" establish such minimums,
the use of the word "shall" in this section is a directory % ord, rather than
a mandatory one.6" 6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal pointed out that the usual meaning
of "shall" is mandatory. Therefore, the question was whether there was
anything in the particular statute to evidence that there was a legislative
intent that it was merely directory. Finding that nothing existed to give the
language that effect, the court held that the complaint was sufficient to
require a response by the district.617 Therefore, the trial court erred. The
appellate court vacated the lower court ruling and remanded for further
proceedings.
618
Royal Palm Square Ass 'n v. Sevco Land Corp.619 This is an opinion
written by Chief Judge Frank with which Judges Ryder and Campbell
concurred. The question presented to the court was whether the South
Florida Water Management District ("District") erred in entering a final
agency action resulting in the dismissal with prejudice of Royal Palm's
amended petition for an administrative hearing in opposition to Sevco's
application for modification of an off-site surface water system permit.62
The question arose when Sevco entered into a contract to purchase
unsettled land next to Royal Palm's property. To determine whether it
could develop the area, Sevco applied to the District to modify the permit
for an off-site surface water system so that Sevco could also run its waters
into that system. To permit this, the District required the creation of an
association between Sevco and Royal Palm to manage the entire water
system. In response, Sevco produced what was entitled a final operation
and maintenance agreement which supposedly showed the association
between Sevco and Royal Palm. However, Royal Palm had not reached
such an agreement with Sevco.
62
'
615. Id. at 522.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 523.
618. Concerned Citizens, 622 So. 2d at 525.
619. 623 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review dismissed, 639 So. 2d 981
(Fla. 1994).
620. Id. at 534.
621. Id.
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Believing that there was such an agreement between the two entities,
the District approved the modification of the permit, provided that the
association was given sufficient ownership of the system so that it had
control over the entire water management facility. Royal Palm amended its
petition challenging the modification because Sevco did not have any
ownership interest in the water management system as required by the
District. After an informal hearing, the Water Management District's
governing board granted the amended petition. However, because Sevco
subsequently agreed to assume the sole and comprehensive responsibility for
the maintenance of that system, the District never had a formal hearing and
dismissed Royal Palm's amended petition with prejudice.622
In deciding to reverse the District and remand the matter with direction
to initiate appropriate formal hearings, the appellate court found that Royal
Palm had met its burden. First, it had to demonstrate that it had a
substantial interest that would suffer immediate injury by the modification.
Royal Palm met this requirement since it was a property owner possessed
of legal right to drain into the system, and its rights could be diminished
dramatically by the introduction of additional surface waters.623 Second,
it had to show that the injury suffered was the type for which such formal
hearings were designed to protect. With respect to the second requirement,
Royal Palm alleged in its amended petition that Sevco's application failed
to satisfy the prerequisite that there was an entity with sufficient ownership
for a proprietary control over the system.624
XXVII. ZONING
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder.625
This is an opinion written by Justice Grimes with which Chief Justice
Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Kogan, and Harding concurred.
Justice Shaw dissented without an opinion. Landowners sought rezoning of
a one half acre parcel. The planning and zoning staff concluded that the
rezoning would be consistent with the comprehensive plan except for the
fact that it was located in the flood plain. After discovering the flood plain
problem could be eliminated by raising the elevation with fill, the planning
and zoning board approved the rezoning request. The application then went
622. Id. at 534-35.
623. Id.
624. Royal Palm Square, 623 So. 2d at 535.
625. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); see John W. Howell and David J. Russ, Planning vs.
Zoning: Snyder Decision Changes Rezoning Standards, FLA. B.J., May 1994, at 16.
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to the county commission. A number of citizens appeared to oppose
rezoning, expressing fears of increased traffic. Without stating a reason, the
county commission denied the rezoning. From there, the case went to the
circuit court, where the landowners were unsuccessful, and subsequently to
the district court of appeal, where their degree of success was amazing.626
However, that success was short lived. The Florida Supreme Court quashed
the district court's opinion. 27
The enactment of an original zoning ordinance is legislative in
character. However, rezoning may be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.
Legislative action "results in the formulation of a general rule of policy,
whereas judicial action results in the application of a general rule of
policy." '628 Therefore, "comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion
of the public are legislative in nature." '629 Conversely, rezonings which
affect a limited number or properties or property owners are judicial in
nature. In this case, the rezoning decision of an area of one-half acre owned
by one person was clearly quasi-judicial. 30
Such decisions are reviewable by the courts by writs of certiorari. The
standard of review is strict scrutiny, but not in the way that term is used in
describing review in constitutional cases. The review is to determine if the
rezoning is in strict compliance with the comprehensive plan. Rezoning that
is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan would be reversed. However,
that does not mean that an application for rezoning consistent with the
comprehensive plan must be granted. The purpose of planning is to deal
with the future as well as the present. The government must be given
leeway to conduct that planning. If the government's decision to deny the
rezoning is based upon substantial, competent evidence, then the court
should defer to that decision.
Accordingly, a landowner who seeks to rezone a particular property is
involved in a quasi-judicial proceeding. He or she has the burden of
proving that the proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan and
complies with the procedural requirements of the zoning ordinance. Then
the burden of proof shifts to the government. The government must
demonstrate that the denial accomplishes a legitimate public purpose, i.e.,
626. Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991),jurisdiction accepted, 605 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1992), and quashed by 627
So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
627. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
628. Id. at 474.
629. Id.
630. Id.
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that the refusal to rezone is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreason-
able.63 ' Having failed to obtain the rezoning, the landowner might claim
that the denial effects a taking of his or her property and seek compensation
by an action for inverse condemnation.
Parker v. Leon County.632 This is an opinion written by Justice
Grimes with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. Justice Shaw dissented without a written
opinion. In Parker, two cases were consolidated for review by the Florida
Supreme Court.633 In both cases, developers had applied for approval of
preliminary subdivision plats and met with denials from the County
Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners on the
theory that the proposed subdivisions were inconsistent with the comprehen-
sive plan. Each developer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
circuit court which held in favor of the developers. 634 The First District
Court of Appeal reversed.635
The district court reasoried that the developers' sole route to circuit
court review of the County Commission decision was via section 163.3215
of the Florida Statutes.636 However, the filing of a verified complaint
with the local government within thirty days of its "inconsistent action" is
a condition precedent to relief under this section.637 Consequently, on
remand the circuit court dismissed the developers' actions. 63 ' The district
court affirmed and certified the following question to the supreme court:
WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR COMMON LAW
CERTIORARI IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE IS
STILL AVAILABLE TO A LANDOWNER/PETITIONER WHO
SEEKS APPELLATE REVIEW OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEVELOPMENT ORDER FINDING COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
631. Id.
632. 627 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1993).
633. Emerald Acres Investments, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Leon County,
601 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by Parker v. Leon County, 627 So.
2d 476 (Fla. 1993); Parker v. Leon County, 601 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992),
quashed by 627 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1993).
634. Parker, 627 So. 2d at 477.
635. Leon County v. Parker, 566 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
636. Id. at 1316.
637. Inconsistent action refers to governmental action inconsistent with the comprehen-
sive plan. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4) (1989).
638. Parker, 627 So. 2d at 478.
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INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215,
FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)639
The supreme court answered the question in the affirmative and
quashed the district court opinion. The court used the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion that section 163.3215 applied
to intervenors,6 0 not to the unsuccessful applicant for a permit or approv-
al. 641
XXVIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation evidences the continuing
evolution of Florida property law. It does not seem to be developing in a
manner inconsistent with the mainstream of real estate law in the United
States. However, it is critical that the property practitioner remain current,
despite the large number of judicial opinions and legislative enactments, to
avoid the complications and pitfalls which befell some of the litigants
discussed in the cases above.
639. Id. at 477.
640. See Board ofTrustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Seminole County
Board of County Comm'rs, 623 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
634 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1994). The Fifth District Court of Appeal held in this case that the
Department of Natural Resources and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund, claiming that the county's development order was inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan, were limited to relief under § 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at
596.
641. Parker, 627 So. 2d at 479-80.
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